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Abstract
The functionality of classically-instructed remotely prepared random secret qubits was in-
troduced in (Cojocaru et al 2018) as a way to enable classical parties to participate in secure
quantum computation and communications protocols. The idea is that a classical party (client)
instructs a quantum party (server) to generate a qubit to the server’s side that is random, un-
known to the server but known to the client. Such task is only possible under computational
assumptions. In this contribution we define a simpler (basic) primitive consisting of only BB84
states, and give a protocol that realizes this primitive and that is secure against the strongest
possible adversary (an arbitrarily deviating malicious server). The specific functions used, were
constructed based on known trapdoor one-way functions, resulting to the security of our basic
primitive being reduced to the hardness of the Learning With Errors problem. We then give
a number of extensions, building on this basic module: extension to larger set of states (that
includes non-Clifford states); proper consideration of the abort case; and verifiablity on the
module level. The latter is based on “blind self-testing”, a notion we introduced, proved in a
limited setting and conjectured its validity for the most general case.
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1 Introduction
In the coming decades, advances in quantum technologies may cause major shifts in the mainstream
computing landscape. In the meantime, we can expect to see quantum devices with high variability
in terms of architectures and capacities, the so-called noisy, intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ)
devices [Pre18] (such as those being developed by IBM, Rigetti, Google, IonQ) that are currently
available to users via classical cloud platforms. In order to be able to proceed to the next milestone
for the utility of these devices in a wider industrial base, the issues of privacy and integrity of the
data manipulation must be addressed.
Early proposals for secure and verifiable delegated quantum computing based on simple obfusca-
tion of data already exist [AS03, Chi05, ABEM17, BFK09a, DKL11, MF12, MPDF13a, GMMR13a,
MDK15, FK17a]. However, these original schemes require a reliable long-distance quantum com-
munication network, connecting all the interested parties, which remains a challenging task.
For these reasons, there has recently been extensive research focusing on the practicality aspect
of secure and verifiable delegated quantum computation. One direction is to reduce the required
communications by exploiting classical fully-homomorphic-encryption schemes [BJ15, DSS16, ADSS17],
or by defining their direct quantum analogues [Lia15, OTF15, TKO+16, LC17]. Different encod-
ings, on the client side, could also reduce the quantum communication [MPDF13b, GMMR13b].
However, in all these approaches, the client still requires some quantum capabilities. While no-go
results indicate restrictions on which of the above properties are jointly achievable for classical
clients [AGKP14, YPDF14, ACGK17, NS17], recent breakthroughs based on post-quantum secure
trapdoor one-way functions, paved the way for developing entirely new approaches towards fully-
classical client protocols for emerging quantum servers. he first such procedures were proposed
in [Mah18a] allowing a classical client to securely delegate a universal quantum computation to a
remote untrusted server, followed by the work of [Bra18], where the construction achieved stronger
security. A similar technique was exploited to derive a classical (non-blind) verification scheme for
universal computing [Mah18b].
Our own independent work [CCKW18]), presented in QCrypt ’18, took a modular approach, to
directly replace the need for any quantum communication channel between client and server with a
computationally (but post-quantum) secure generation of secret and random single qubits (rather
than directly obfuscating a target quantum functionalities). It was shown then how a classical client
could use this module (referred to as QFactory) to achieve secure delegated universal quantum
computing, but potentially also, other functionalities such as multi-party quantum computation.
Following that philosophy, we present in this paper for the first time a universal yet minimal
functionality module that is fully secure and verifiable at the module level and could be used
as a black box in other client-server applications to replace the need for a reliable long-distance
quantum communication network. However, the price one has to pay, would be a reduction from
information-theoretic security (achievable using quantum communication) to post-quantum com-
putational security via our modules. The ultimate vision would be to develop a hybrid network
of both classical and quantum communication channels, depending on the desired level of security
and the technology development of NISQ devices admitting classical or quantum links [WEH18].
1.1 Our Contributions
In [CCKW18] we defined a classical client - quantum server functionality of delegated pseudo-secret
random qubit generator (PSRQG) that can replace the need for quantum channel between parties
in certain quantum communication protocols, with the only trade-off being that the protocols would
become computationally secure (against quantum adversaries). In this paper:
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1. We present a new protocol called Malicious 4-states QFactory in Section 3 that achieves the
functionality of classically instructed remote secret generation of the states {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}
(known as the BB84 states), given 2 cryptographic functions: 1) a trapdoor one-way function
that is quantum-safe, two-regular and collision resistant and 2) a homomorphic, hardcore
predicate. The novelty of this new protocol reflects in both simplicity of construction, as
well as enhanced security, namely the protocol is secure against any arbitrarily deviating
adversary. The target output qubit set is one of the four BB84 states, states that form the
core requirement of any quantum communication protocol.
Then, in Subsection 3.2, we present the security of the Malicious 4-states QFactory against
any fully malicious server, by proving that the basis of the generated qubits are completely
hidden from any adversary, using the properties of the two functions, the security being based
on the hardness of the Learning with Errors problem.
2. While the above-mentioned results do not depend on the specific function used, the existence
of such functions (with all desired properties) makes the functionality a practical primitive
that can be employed as described in this paper. In Section 4, we describe how to construct
the two-regular, collision resistant, trapdoor one-way family of functions and the homomor-
phic, hardcore predicate. Furthermore, we prove using reductions in Subsection 4.1 that the
resulting functions maintain all the required properties.
3. In order to demonstrate the modular construction of the basic Malicious 4-states QFactory,
we also present in Section 5, a secure and efficient extension to the functionality of gener-
ating 8 states, called the Malicious 8-states QFactory protocol (where the security refers to
the fact that the basis of the new state is completely hidden). The set of output states{|+θ〉 | θ ∈ {0, π4 , ..., 7π4 }} (no longer within the Clifford group) are used in various protocols,
including protocols for verifiable blind quantum computation.
4. While the protocol introduced in Section 3 requires (for the security proof) a family of func-
tions having 2 preimages with probability super-polynomially close to 1, we also define in
Section 6 a protocol named Malicious-Abort 4-states QFactory, that is secure when the func-
tions have 2 preimages with only a constant (greater than 1/2) probability. Indeed, even if
the parameters used for the first category of functions are implicitly used in some protocols
[Mah18a], the second category of functions is strictly more secure and more standard in the
cryptographic literature [Bra18]. The Malicious-Abort 4-states QFactory protocol is proven
secure also for this second category of functions, assuming that the classical Yao’s XOR lemma
also applies for one-round protocols (with classical messages) with quantum adversaries.
5. The Malicious 8-states QFactory can be further extended in order to offer a notion of ver-
ification for QFactory in Section 7, the new protocol being called Verifiable QFactory. We
demonstrate that this notion of verifiability of QFactory is suitable, by showing that it is
sufficient to obtain verifiable blind quantum computation. Such protocol would be the first
classical client, verifiable, blind quantum computation protocol.
We introduce in Subsection 7.2 a novel framework called blind self-testing, which differs from
the standard self-testing by replacing the non-locality assumptions for such tests with blind-
ness conditions. We describe how this technique can be used to prove the verifiability of
QFactory. Note however, that the security of the Verifiable QFactory Protocol 7.2 is conjec-
tured, while we expect that the full proof would follow using the most general case of the
novel notion of blind self-testing that we introduced. Finally, we prove how a (much simpler)
i.i.d. blind self-testing is achievable.
4
1.2 Overview of the protocols and proofs
The Protocol. The general idea is that a classical client communicates with a quantum server
instructing him to perform certain actions. By the end of the interaction, the client obtains a
random value B = B1B2 ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}, while the server (if he followed the protocol) ends up
with the state HB1XB2 |0〉, i.e. with one of the BB84 states. Moreover, the server, irrespective of
whether he followed the protocol or how he deviated, cannot guess the value of the (basis) bit B1
any better than making a random guess.
This module is sufficient to perform (either directly or with simple extensions) multiple secure
computation protocols including blind quantum computation.
To achieve such a task, we require three central elements. Firstly, the quantum operations
performed by the server should not be repeatable, in order to avoid letting the (adversarial) server
run multiple times these operations and obtain multiple copies of the same output state. That would
(obviously) compromise the security since direct tomography of a single qubit is straightforward.
This can be achieved if the protocol includes a measurement of many qubits, where the probability
of getting twice the same outcome would be exponentially small. The second element is that the
server should not be able to efficiently classically simulate the quantum computation that he needs
to perform. This is to stop the server from running everything classically and obtaining the explicit
classical description of the output state. This is achieved using techniques from post-quantum
cryptography and specifically the Learning-With-Errors problem. Lastly, the computation has to
be easy to perform for the client, since she needs to know the output state. This asymmetry (easy
for client/ hard for server) can be achieved only in the computational setting, where the client has
some extra trapdoor information. The protocol requires the following cryptographic primities:
• F : a family of 2-regular, collision resistant, trapdoor one-way functions (that can be easily
constructed from a family of injective, homomorphic, trapdoor one-way functions G);
• h: a homomorphic (related to the homomorphic operation of G) and hardcore predicate of
the functions G;
Given these functions, the protocol steps are given below: The client sends the descriptions of the
functions fk (from the family F) and h. The server’s actions are described by the circuit given in
Figure 1 (see Section 3), classically instructed by the client: prepares one register at ⊗nH |0〉 and
second register at |0〉m; then applies Ufk using the first register as control and the second as target;
measures the second register in the computational basis, obtains the outcome y. Through these
steps server produces a superposition of the 2 preimages of y for the function fk. Next, the server
is instructed to apply a unitary corresponding to the function h and to measures all but one qubit,
which represents the output of the protocol. This last step intuitively magnifies the randomness of
all the qubits to this final output qubit.
Then, it can be proven that, in an honest run, this output state is:
|out〉 = HB1XB2 |0〉 , where
B1 = h(z) ⊕ h(z′)
B2 = [bn ⊕
n−1∑
i=1
(zi ⊕ z′i) · bi mod 2] · B1 ⊕ h(z) · (1⊕B1)
and where the 2 preimages of fk are written as: x = (z, 0) and x
′ = (z′, 1).
Therefore, the client can efficiently obtain the description of the output state, namely B1 and B2
by inverting y, to obtain the 2 preimages x and x′ using his secret trapdoor information tk.
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Security. Informally speaking the desired security property of the module is to prove that the
server cannot guess better than randomly the basis bit B1 of what the client has, no matter how
the server deviates or what answers he returns. In other words, we prove that given that the client
chooses k randomly, then no matter which messages y and b the server returns, he cannot determine
B1. More specifically, using the properties of the two cryptographic functions, we show that the
basis of the output state is independent of the messages sent by the server and essentially, the basis
is fixed by the client at the beginning of the protocol.
Here it is important to emphasize that the simplicity of our modular construction allow us to
make a direct reduction from the above security property to the cryptographic assumptions of our
primitives functions F and h. Indeed, from the expression above, we can see that at the end of the
interaction the client has recorded as the basis bit the expression B1 = h(z) ⊕ h(z′).
However, from the properties of the functions, we observe the following:
• The 2 preimages of fk satisfy: z′ = z − z0
• From the homomorphic property of h, we get: B1 = h(z0)
• The basis bit B1 depends on the choice of z0 (randomly chosen by the client) and nothing
else. Therefore B1 is independent from the actions of the server.
• Finally, h being a hardcore predicate, implies that the server should be unable to guess this
irrespective of what answers y, b he returns.
The Primitive Construction. In order to use this module in practise, it is crucial to have
functions that satisfy our cryptographic requirements, and explore the choices of parameters that
ensure that all these properties are jointly satisfied. Building on the function construction of
[CCKW18] we gave specific choices that achieve these properties. The starting point is the injective,
trapdoor one-way family of functions from [MP12], where the hardness of the function is derived
from the Learning With Errors problem.
The Extended Protocol. In order to use the above protocol for applications such as blind
quantum computing [BFK09b], we need to be able to produce states taken from the (extended)
set of eight states {|+θ〉 , θ ∈ {0, π4 , ..., 7π4 }}. Importantly, we still need to ensure that the bits
corresponding to the basis of each qubits produced, remain hidden. Here we prove how given two
states produced by the basic protocol described previously, which we denote as |in1〉 and |in2〉, we
can obtain a single state from the 8-states set, denoted |out〉, ensuring that no information about
the bits of the basis of |out〉 is leaked1.
To achieve this, we need to find an operation (see Figure 2 in Section 5.1), that in the honest case
maps the indices of the inputs to those of the output using a map that satisfies certain conditions.
This relation (inputs/output) should be such that learning anything about the basis of the output
state implies learning non-negligible information for the basis of (one) input. This directly means,
that any computationally bounded adversary that can break the basis blindness of the output, can
use this to construct an attack that would also break the basis blindness of at least one of the
inputs, i.e. he would break the security guarantees of the basic module that was proven earlier.
Other Properties. To further demonstrate the utility of our core module, as a building block for
other client-server protocols, one might wish to expand further the desired properties of the basic
functionality, as well as further enhancing the security model. The simplicity of our construction
allows us to extend our security proof directly to the Abstract Cryptography framework of [MR11]
1Note that one of the input states is exactly the output of the basic module, while the second comes from a slightly
modified version (essentially rotated in the XY-plane of the Bloch sphere).
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(work in preparation). Next, to obtain the verifiability of the module (i.e. imposing an honest
behaviour on the server) we propose a generalization of the self-testing, where the non-locality
condition is replaced by the blindness property and the analysis is done in the computational set-
ting. To further improve the practicality of the black box call of the QFactory we also present the
security against abort scenario that could be achieved based on a quantum version of Yao’s XOR
Lemma. However, these additional properties require stronger basic assumptions that we leave as
an open question to be removed or proven correct separately.
2 Preliminaries
We are considering protocols secure against quantum adversaries, so we assume that all the prop-
erties of our functions hold for a general Quantum Polynomial Time (QPT) adversary, rather than
the usual Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) one. We will denote D the domain of the functions,
while D(n) is the subset of strings of length n.
The following definitions are for PPT adversaries, however in this paper we will generally use
quantum-safe versions of those definitions and thus security is guaranteed against QPT adversaries.
Definition 2.1 (One-way). A family of functions {fk : D → R}k∈K is one-way if:
• There exists a PPT algorithm that can compute fk(x) for any index function k, outcome of
the PPT parameter-generation algorithm Gen and any input x ∈ D;
• Any PPT algorithm A can invert fk with at most negligible probability over the choice of k:
Pr
k←Gen(1n)
x←D
rc←{0,1}∗
[f(A(k, fk(x)) = f(x)] ≤ negl(n)
where rc represents the randomness used by A
Definition 2.2 (Collision resistant). A family of functions {fk : D → R}k∈K is collision resis-
tant if:
• There exists a PPT algorithm that can compute fk(x) for any index function k, outcome of
the PPT parameter-generation algorithm Gen and any input x ∈ D;
• Any PPT algorithm A can find two inputs x 6= x′ such that fk(x) = fk(x′) with at most
negligible probability over the choice of k:
Pr
k←Gen(1n)
rc←{0,1}∗
[A(k) = (x, x′)such that x 6= x′ and fk(x) = fk(x′)] ≤ negl(n)
where rc is the randomness of A (rc will be omitted from now).
Definition 2.3 (k-regular). A deterministic function f : D → R is k-regular if ∀y ∈ ℑ(f), we
have |f−1(y)| = k.
Definition 2.4 (Trapdoor Function). A family of functions {fk : D → R} is a trapdoor function
if:
• There exists a PPT algorithm Gen which on input 1n outputs (k, tk), where k represents the
index of the function;
• {fk : D → R}k∈K is a family of one-way functions;
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• There exists a PPT algorithm Inv, which on input tk (which is called the trapdoor information)
output by Gen(1n) and y = fk(x) can invert y (by returning all preimages of y
2) with non-
negligible probability over the choice of (k, tk) and uniform choice of x.
Definition 2.5 (Hard-core Predicate). A function hc : D → {0, 1} is a hard-core predicate for
a function f if:
• There exists a QPT algorithm that for any input x can compute hc(x);
• Any PPT algorithm A when given f(x), can compute hc(x) with negligible better than 1/2
probability:
Pr
x←D(n)
rc←{0,1}∗
[A(f(x), 1n) = hc(x)] ≤ 12 + negl(n), where rc represents the randomness used by A;
The Learning with Errors problem (LWE) can be described in the following way:
Definition 2.6 (LWE problem (informal)). Given s, an n dimensional vector with elements in
Zq, for some modulus q, the task is to distinguish between a set of polynomially many noisy random
linear combinations of the elements of s and a set of polynomially many random numbers from Zq.
Regev [Reg05] and Peikert [Pei09] have given quantum and classical reductions from the average
case of LWE to problems such as approximating the length of the shortest vector or the shortest
independent vectors problem in the worst case, problems which are conjectured to be hard even for
quantum computers.
Theorem 2.1 (Reduction LWE, from [Reg05, Therem 1.1]). Let n, q be integers and α ∈ (0, 1) be
such that αq > 2
√
n. If there exists an efficient algorithm that solves LWEq,Ψ¯α, then there exists an
efficient quantum algorithm that approximates the decision version of the shortest vector problem
GapSVP and the shortest independent vectors problem SIVP to within O˜(n/α) in the worst case.
Definition 2.7 (Function Unitary). For any function f : A → B that can be described by a
polynomially-sized classical circuit, we define the controlled-unitary Uf , as acting in the following
way:
Uf |x〉 |y〉 = |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉 ∀x ∈ A ∀y ∈ B, (1)
where we name the first register |x〉 control and the second register |y〉 target. Given the classical
description of this function f , we can always define a QPT algorithm that efficiently implements
Uf .
2.1 Notations
We assume basic familiarity with quantum computing notions.
For a state |+θ〉 = 1√2(|0〉+ eiθ |1〉), where θ ∈ {0,
π
4 , ...,
7π
4 }, we use the notation:
θ =
π
4
L
2While in the standard definition of trapdoor functions it suffices for the inversion algorithm Inv to return one
of the preimages of any output of the function, in our case we require a two-regular tradpdoor function where the
inversion procedure returns both preimages for any function output.
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Additionally, as L is a 3-bit string, we write it as L = L1L2L3, where L1, L2, L3 represent the bits
of L.
As a result when we refer to the basis of the |+θ〉 state, it is equivalent to referring to the last 2
bits of L, thus saying that nothing is leaked about the basis of this state, is equivalent to saying
nothing is leaked about the bits L2 and L3.
For a set of 4 quantum states {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}, we denote the index of each state using 2 bits:
B1, B2, with B1 = 0 if and only if the state is |0〉 or |1〉, and B2 = 0 if and only if the state is |0〉
or |+〉. We will use interchangeably the Dirac notation and the basis/value notation.
In the following sections, we will consider polynomially bounded malicious adversaries, usually
denoted by A. The honest clients will be denoted with the π letter, and both honest parties and
adversaries can output some values, that could eventually be used in other protocols. To denote
that two parties πA and A interact in a protocol, and that πA outputs a while A outputs b, we
write (a, b)← (πA‖πB) (we may forget the left hand side, or replace variables with underscores “ ”
if it is not relevant). We can also refer to the values of the classical messages send between the
two parties using something like Pr[a = accept | (πA‖A)], and this probability is implicitly over
the internal randomness of πA and A. To specify a two-party protocol, it is enough to specify the
two honest parties (πA, πB). Moreover, if the protocol is just made of one round of communication,
we can just write y ← A(x) with x the first message sent to A, and y the messages sent from A.
Finally, a value with a tilde, such as d˜, represents a guess from an adversary.
3 The Malicious 4-states QFactory Protocol
The Malicious 4-states QFactory Protocol uses a family of functions F and a function h.
F is a family {fk : D × {0, 1} → R}k of 2-regular, collision resistant, trapdoor one-way functions
(against quantum adversaries). This family of functions is constructed using a family G = {gk :
D → R}k of injective, trapdoor one-way, homomorphic functions 3:
There exist 2 operations ” +D ” acting on D and ” +R ” acting on R such that:
gk(z1 +D z2) = gk(z1) +R gk(z2) ∀k ∀z1, z2 ∈ D (2)
The function h : D → {0, 1} is a hardcore predicate with respect to the function gk and
homomorphic:
h(z1)⊕ h(z2) = h(z2 −D z1) ∀z1, z2 ∈ D, (3)
where ”−D” is the inverse of the operation ”+D”.
Then,the functions F are constructed as:
fk : D × {0, 1} → R
fk(z, c) = gk(z) +R c · y0 (4)
where y0 = gk(z0) for a fixed z0.
3We only require G to be homomorphic with high probability for a single application of the operation +D and this
would result in F being 2-regular with high probability (as we prove in appendix F).
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Protocol 3.1 Malicious 4-states QFactory Protocol: classical delegation of the BB84 states
Requirements:
Public: The functions F and h described above. For simplicity, we will represent the sets D and
R, using n− 1, respectively m bit strings: D = {0, 1}n−1, R = {0, 1}m.
Stage 1: Preimages superposition
– Client: runs the algorithm (k, tk) ← GenF (1n). The description of h and k are public inputs
(known to any party), while tk is the private input of the Client. – Client: instructs Server to
prepare one register at ⊗nH |0〉 and second register initiated at |0〉m.
– Client: sends k to Server and the Server applies Ufk using the first register as control and the
second as target.
– Server: measures the second register in the computational basis, obtains the outcome y. Here,
in an honest run, the Server would have a state (|x〉+ |x′〉)⊗ |y〉 with fk(x) = fk(x′) = y and
y ∈ ℑfk.
Stage 2: Output preparation
– Server: applies Uh using all but the last qubit of the preimage state |x〉 + |x′〉 as control and
another qubit iniated at |0〉 as target. Then, measures all the qubits, but the first one (the target)
in the { 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉)} basis, obtaining the outcome b = (b1, ..., bn). Now, the Server returns both y
and b to the Client.
– Client: using the trapdoor tk computes x, x
′ and obtains the classical description of the Server’s
state.
Output: If the protocol is run honestly, the state that the Server has produced is:
|Output〉 = Xh(z)Zbn+
∑n−1
i=1 (zi⊕z′i)·biHh(z)⊕h(z
′) |0〉 (5)
where z and z′ are the strings obtained from x, respectively x′ by removing the last bit, while zi is
the i-th bit of z.
3.1 Correctness of Malicious 4-states QFactory
In an honest run, the description of the output state of the protocol depends on the measurement
results y ∈ Im(fk), and b, but also on the 2 preimages x and x′ of y. Without loss of generality
we assume that these 2 preimages differ in the last bit We notice, that for our construction of the
family F , the 2 unique preimages of the same image differ in the last bit, therefore we will use the
notation: x = (z, 0) and x′ = (z′, 1).
The output state of Malicious 4-states QFactory belongs to the set of states {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}
and its exact description is the following:
Theorem 3.1. In an honest run, the Output state of the Malicious 4-states QFactory Protocol is
a BB84 state whose basis is B1 = h(z) ⊕ h(z′), i.e.:
|Output〉 = HB1XB2 |0〉 (6)
where:
B1 = h(z) ⊕ h(z′) (7)
B2 = [bn ⊕
n−1∑
i=1
(zi ⊕ z′i) · bi mod 2] · [h(z) ⊕ h(z′)]⊕ {h(z) · [1⊕ h(z) ⊕ h(z′)]}
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(8)
Proof. The operations performed by the quantum server, can be described as follows:
|0〉
U˜h
|Output〉
|0〉 H
Ufk
MX
?> =<
89 :;
|0〉 H
· · · · · · · · · = b
|0〉 H
|0〉 H
|0〉
MZ
?> =<
89 :;
· · · = y
|0〉
Figure 1: The circuit computed by the Server
|0〉 ⊗ |0n〉 ⊗ |0m〉 I2⊗H⊗n⊗I2⊗m−−−−−−−−−−→
|0〉 ⊗ (
∑
x∈Dom(fk)
|x〉)⊗ |0m〉 I2⊗Ufk−−−−−→
|0〉 ⊗ (
∑
x∈Dom(fk)
|x〉 ⊗ |fk(x)〉) 2-regularity of fk−−−−−−−−−−→
|0〉 ⊗ (
∑
y∈Im(fk)
(|x〉+ ∣∣x′〉)⊗ |y〉) I2⊗I2⊗n⊗M⊗mZ−−−−−−−−−−→
|0〉 ⊗ (|x〉+ ∣∣x′〉)⊗ |y〉 = |0〉 ⊗ (|z〉 |0〉+ ∣∣z′〉 |1〉)⊗ |y〉 U˜h⊗I2⊗m−−−−−−→
(|h(z)〉 ⊗ |z〉 |0〉+ ∣∣h(z′)〉⊗ ∣∣z′〉 |1〉)⊗ |y〉 I2⊗M⊗nX ⊗I2⊗m−−−−−−−−−−→
|Output〉 ⊗ |b1〉 ...⊗ |bn〉 ⊗ |y〉 ⇒
|Output〉 = Xh(z)Zbn+
∑n−1
i=1 (zi⊕z′i)·biHh(z)⊕h(z
′) |0〉 (9)
where U˜h is defined as Uh acting on the first register as target and second register as control:
|0〉 |z〉 |c〉 U˜h−−→ |h(z)〉 |z〉 |c〉.
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The sever initially prepares the state |0n〉⊗|0m〉, where we will call the first register the preimage
register, and the second one the image register.
After applying Ufk we obtain the state
∑
x∈Dom(fk) |x〉 |fk(x)〉. Using the 2-regularity property of
fk, after measuring the second register (in the computational basis) and obtaining the measurement
result y ∈ Im(fk), the state can be expressed as (|x〉+ |x′〉)⊗ |y〉, where x and x′ are the 2 unique
preimages of y. By omitting the image register and by initializing another qubit in the |0〉 state
and using the above notation, the input to the unitary U˜h can be written as:
(|z〉 ⊗ |0〉+ ∣∣z′〉⊗ |1〉)⊗ |0〉 (10)
U˜h is basically Uh acting on the first and third register (|z〉 |c〉 |0〉 U˜h−−→ |z〉 |c〉 |h(z)〉), and after we
apply it, we obtain the state:
(|z〉 ⊗ |0〉 ⊗ |h(z)〉 +
∣∣z′〉⊗ |1〉 ⊗ ∣∣h(z′)〉 (11)
As a final step, we measure all but the last qubit of this state in the { 1√
2
(|0〉±|1〉)} basis (obtaining
the measurement result string b), and the unmeasured qubit represents the output of the Malicious
4-states QFactory protocol.
It can be noticed that, in an honest run of the protocol, using y and the trapdoor information
of the function fk, the Client obtains x and x
′ and thus can efficiently determine what is the output
state that the Server has prepared.
In the next section, we prove that no malicious adversary can distinguish between the 2 possible
bases {|0〉, |1〉} and {|+〉, |−〉} of the output qubit, or equivalently distinguish whether B1 is 0 or
1.
3.2 Security against Malicious Adversaries of Malicious 4-states QFactory
In any run of the protocol, honest or malicious, the state that the client believes that the server
has, is given by Thereom 3.1.
Therefore, the task that a malicious server wants to achieve, is to be able to guess, as good as he
can, the index of the output state that the client (based on the public communication) thinks the
server has produced. In particular, in our case, the server needs to guess the bit B1 (corresponding
to the basis) of the (honest) output state.
Definition 3.1 (4 states basis blindness). We say that a protocol (πA, πB) achieves basis-blindness
with respect to an ideal set of 4 states S if:
• S is the set of states that the protocol outputs, i.e.:
Pr[|φ〉 ∈ S | ( , |φ〉)← (πA‖πB)] = 1
• and if no information is leaked about the index bit B1 of the output state of the protocol, i.e:
∀A,Pr[B1 = B˜1 | (B1B2, B˜1)← (πA‖A)] ≤ 1/2 + negl(n)
Theorem 3.2. Malicious 4-states QFactory satisfies 4-state basis blindness with respect to the ideal
set of states {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}.
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Proof. From Theorem 3.1, we notice that the basis of the output qubit is {|0〉 , |1〉} if B1 =
h(z) ⊕ h(z′) = 0 and the basis is {|+〉 , |−〉} if B1 = h(z) ⊕ h(z′) = 1.
Therefore, to hide the basis of the output qubit (against any malicious adversary) is equivalent to
hiding the value of the bit B1 = h(z) ⊕ h(z′).
Next, we will prove that h(z)⊕h(z′) is indistinguishable from a random bit, using the properties
of the functions F and h.
As a first step, we recall that our function fk is constructed using the injective, homomorphic
trapdoor one-way function gk:
fk : D × {0, 1} → R
fk(z, c) = gk(z) +R c · y0 (12)
where y0 = gk(z0) for a fixed z0
4. The proof of this construction can be found in Thm 6.1, in
[CCKW18]).
Using the homomorphic property of gk from Equation 2, we can rewrite fk as:
fk(z, c) = gk(z) +R c · y0 = gk(z) +R c · gk(z0) = gk(z +D (c · z0)) (13)
And as gk is injective, for any image y of the function fk, the 2 preimages of y will be of the form
x = (z, 0) and x′ = (z +D z0, 1) and equivalently z′ = z +D z0.5
Then, using the homomorphic property of h, we deduce that the basis bit B1 of the output state
is equal to:
B1 = h(z) ⊕ h(z′) = h(z′ −D z) = h(z0) (14)
Finally, to prove that B1 is completely hidden we will use the hardcore property of h.
To do that, we proceed with a proof by contradiction. We assume there exists a QPT adversary
A that can determine B1 with a non-negligible advantage and construct a QPT adversary A′
that breaks the hardcore predicate property of h with the same non-negligible advantage, which
completes the proof.
HardcoreA′,h
1 : (k, tk)←$GenG(1n)
2 : z0 ←$D
3 : k′ ← (k, gk(z0))
4 : t′k ← (tk, z0)
5 : B′1 ← A(k′, h)
6 : // B1 is the index of the outcome
7 : // that we assumed A is able to determine
8 : return B′1// as B1 = h(z0), this is equivalent to breaking the hardcore property
9 : // with the same non-negligible advantage of A to determine B1
10 :
4At the beginning of each run of Malicious 4-states QFactory, the Client chooses a new z0 uniformly at random
from the domain of gk and then he sends y0 = gk(z0) to the Server, in order for the Server to compute Ufk .
5As the functions G are homomorphic with high probability, we derive 2-regularity and thus the existence of 2
preimages of this form with high probability as we prove in Lemma F.1.
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Remark: in the run of the Malicious 4-states QFactory protocol, the adversary/server has
no access to the abort/accept bit, specifying whether the Client wants to abort the protocol after
receiving the image y from the server (the abort occurs when y does not have exactly two preimages).
See Section 6 to see how we address this issue.
4 Function Implementation
To complete the construction of Malicious 4-states QFactory, we must find functions F and h sat-
isfying the properties described in Section 3.
The starting point is the injective, trapdoor one-way family of functions G¯ = {g¯K : Znq × χm →
Z
m
q }K from [MP12] (where χ defines the set of integers bounded in absolute value by some value µ
which will be defined later):
g¯K(s, e) = Ks+ e mod q (15)
From this we construct the family of functions F¯ = {f¯K : Znq × χm × {0, 1} → Zmq }:
f¯K(s, e, c) = Ks+ e+ c · y¯0 mod q (16)
where y¯0 = g¯K(s0, e0), with s0 chosen at random from Z
n
q and e0 chosen at random from χ
′m (χ′
is the set of integers bounded in absolute value by some value µ′ < µ) .
Lemma 4.1 (from [CCKW18]). The family of functions of F¯ is 2 regular with high (constant)
probability, trapdoor, one-way and collision resistant (all these properties are true even against a
quantum attacker), assuming that there is no quantum algorithm that can efficiently solve SIV P γ
for γ = poly(n), for the following choices of parameters:
q = 25⌈log(n)⌉+21
m = 23n+ 5n ⌈log(n)⌉
µ = 2mn
√
23 + 5log(n)
µ′ = µ/m (17)
4.1 Construction of F
Now, we are able to define the 2 families of functions G, F :
gK : Z
n
q × χm × {0, 1} → Zmq
gK(s, e, d) = g¯K(s, e) + d ·

q
2
0
...
0
 mod q = Ks+ e+ d ·

q
2
0
...
0
 mod q 6 (18)
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fK : Z
n
q × χm × {0, 1} × {0, 1} → Zmq
fK(s, e, c, d) = Ks+ e+ c · y0 + d · v mod q (19)
where y0 = gK(s0, e0, d0), with s0 chosen at random from Z
n
q , e0 chosen at random from χ
′m and
d0 chosen at random from {0, 1} .
Before defining the function h, we must ensure that gK has the same properties as g¯K (homo-
morphic, injective and one-way), which would also imply that fK has the same properties as f¯K
(quantum-safe, two-regular, trapdoor one-way).
Lemma 4.2. If G¯ is a family of homomorphic functions, then G is also a family of homomorphic
functions.
Proof. To prove that gK is homomorphic, we notice that:
gK(s1, e1, d1) + gK(s2, e2, d2) = g¯K(s1, e1) + d1 · v + g¯K(s2, e2) + d2 · v mod q
= g¯K(s1 + s2 mod q, e1 + e2) + (d1 + d2) · v mod q
= gK(s1 + s2 mod q, e1 + e2, d1 ⊕ d2)
where for the last equality we used the fact that if d1, d2 ∈ {0, 1}, then d1 · q2 + d2 · q2 mod q =
(d1 ⊕ d2) · q2 mod q.
We make the following remark: the proof of Lemma 4.2 is constructed for the case when g¯ is
perfectly homomorphic, but it also holds in the case when g¯ is homomorphic with high probability,
resulting in g being homomorphic with the same high probability.
Lemma 4.3. If G¯ is a family of one-way functions, then G is also a family of one-way functions.
Proof. To prove the one-wayness of g, we are going to reduce it to the one-wayness of g¯.
Thus, we assume there exists a QPT adversary A that can invert g with probability P and we
construct a QPT adversary A′ inverting g¯ with the same probability P .
InvertA′,K(y)
1 : d←$ {0, 1}
2 : y′ ← y + d · v
3 : (s′, e′, d′)← AK(y′)
4 : return (s′, e′)
Lemma 4.4. If G¯ is a family of injective functions, then G is a family of injective functions.
Proof. To prove this, we will use the injectivity property of the function g¯.
gK(s, e, d) = g¯K(s, e) + d · v
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Assume there exist 2 tuples (s1, e1, d1) and (s2, e2, d2) such that g(s1, e1, d1) = g(s2, e2, d2). To
prove that g is injective we must show that (s1, e1, d1) = (s2, e2, d2).
This is equivalent to:
g¯K(s1, e1) + d1 · v = g¯K(s2, e2) + d2 · v
g¯K(s1, e1)− g¯K(s2, e2) + (d1 − d2) · v = 0 (20)
Now, if d1 = d2, then we have that g¯(s1, e1)− g¯(s2, e2) = 0, and because g¯ is injective, this would
imply that s1 = s2 and e1 = e2 and thus g would also be injective.
Let us suppose that d1 6= d2 and we will prove that this is impossible. Without loss of generality
we can assume that d1 = 0 and d2 = 1.
Thus, we want to show that it is impossible to have (s1, e1) and (s2, e2) such that:
g¯K(s1, e1)− g¯K(s2, e2) = v (21)
Equation is equivalent to:
Ks1 + e1 −Ks2 − e2 =

q
2
0
...
0
 mod q (22)
This can be rewritten as:
K1,1(s1,1 − s2,1) + ...+K1,n(s1,n − s2,n) + (e1,1 − e2,1) = q
2
mod q (23)
Ki,1(s1,1 − s2,1) + ...+Ki,n(s1,n − s2,n) + (e1,i − e2,i) = 0 mod q∀i = 2, ..,m (24)
where s1,i and s2,i are the i-th bits of s1 and s2 respectively and e1,i and e2,i are the i-th bit of e1,
respectively e2.
Now, as the function g¯K : Z
n
q × χm × {0, 1} → Zmq , where K ← Zm×nq is injective, the following
function is also injective:
g¯1K1 : Z
n
q × χm−1 × {0, 1} → Zm−1q , where K1 ← Zm−1×nq and where g¯ and g¯1 have the exact same
definition:
g¯1K1(s, e) = K1s+ e mod q
More specifically, the only difference between the 2 functions is the change of dimension from m to
m− 1, but as the injectivity proof from [MP12] holds for any m = Ω(n), then g¯1 is also injective.
Now, consider the matrix K1 obtained from K by removing the first line. As shown above, g¯1K1
is an injective function, thus from Equation 24, we get that:
s1 = s2 (25)
e1,i = e2,i ∀ i = 2, ..,m (26)
Now as s1 = s2, from Equation 23, we obtain e1,1 − e2,1 = q2 .
However, from the domain of g¯, we have that: |e1,1 − e2,1| < 2µ < q2 (where for the last inequality
we used Lemma 4.1). Contradiction.
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4.2 Construction of function h
At this stage, we can define h:
h : Znq × Zmq × {0, 1} → {0, 1}
h(s, e, d) = d (27)
Theorem 4.5. The function h is homomorphic and hardcore predicate (with respect to the one-way
function g).
Proof. We can easily notice the homomorphicity property of the defined function h:
h(s1, e1, d1)⊕ h(s2, e2, d2) = d1 ⊕ d2
= h(s1 + s2 mod q, e1 + e2 mod q, d1 ⊕ d2) (28)
To prove that h is a hardcore predicate of gK , we must prove that for any QPT adversary A, we
have:
Pr s←$Znq
e←$χm
d←$ {0,1}
[A(1λ,K, gK(s, e, d)) = h(s, e, d)] ≤ 12 + negl(λ) (29)
Using the definitions of the 2 functions, we can express it as:
Pr s←$Znq
e←$χm
d←$ {0,1}
[A(1λ,K,Ks + e+ d · v) = d] ≤ 12 + negl(λ) (30)
This is equivalent to prove that the distributions D1 = {K,Ks+ e} and D2 = {K,Ks+ e+ v} are
indistinguishable7, or equivalently:
{Ki, 〈Ki, s〉+ ei}mi=1
c≈ {Ki, 〈Ki, s〉+ ei + vi}mi=1 (31)
Using the decisional LWE assumption we already know that when ui are uniform chosen from Zq,
we have 8:
{Ki, 〈Ki, s〉+ ei}mi=1
c≈ {Ki, ui}mi=1 (32)
Then, as v is a fixed vector, we also have that:
{Ki, 〈Ki, s〉+ ei + vi}mi=1
c≈ {Ki, ui}mi=1
c≈ {Ki, 〈Ki, s〉+ ei}mi=1 (33)
which completes the proof.
7It is also easy to write an explicit reduction
8this holds because the parameters (fully given in [CCKW18, Lemma 6.9]) of the function are chosen to make y0
indistinguishable from a random vector by a direct reduction to LWE
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5 The Malicious 8-states QFactory Protocol
In order to use the Malicious 4-states QFactory Protocol functionality for applications such as
blind quantum computing [BFK09b], we need to be able to produce states taken from the set
{|+θ〉 , θ ∈ {0, π4 , ..., 7π4 }}, always ensuring that the bases of these qubits remain hidden. Here we
prove how by obtaining two states of Malicious 4-states QFactory Protocol, we can obtain a single
state from the 8-states set, while no information about the bases of the new output state is leaked.
To achieve this, we need to find an operation, that in the honest case maps the correct inputs
to the outputs, in such a way, that the index of the output state corresponding to the basis, is
directly related with the bases bits of the input states. This relation should be such that learning
anything about the basis of the output state implies learning non-negligible information for the
input. This directly means, that any computationally bounded adversary that breaks the 8-states
basis blindness of the output, also breaks the 4-states basis blindness of at least one of the inputs.9
Protocol 5.1 Malicious 8-states QFactory
Requirements: Same as in Protocol Protocol 3.1
Input: Client runs 2 times the algorithm GenF (1n), obtaining (k1, t1k), (k
2, t2k). Client keeps t
1
k, t
2
k
private.
Protocol:
– Client: runs the Malicious 4-states QFactory algorithm to obtain a state |in1〉 and a ”rotated”
Malicious 4-states QFactory to obtain a state |in2〉 (by a rotated Malicious 4-states QFactory
we mean a Malicious 4-states QFactory, but where the last set of measurements in the |±〉 basis
(Figure 1) is replaced by a set of measurements in the
∣∣∣±pi
2
〉
basis).
– Client: records measurement outcomes (y1, b1), (y2, b2) and computes and stores the correspond-
ing indices of the output states of the 2 Malicious 4-states QFactory runs: (B1, B2) for |in1〉 and
(B′1, B
′
2) for |in2〉
– Client: instructs the server to apply the Merge Gadget (Figure 2) on the states |in1〉, |in2〉.
– Server: returns the 2 measurement results s1, s2.
– Client: using (B1, B2), (B
′
1, B
′
2), s1, s2 computes the index L = L1L2L3 ∈ {0, 1}3 of the output
state.
Output: If the protocol is run honestly, the state that the Server has produced is:
|out〉 = X(s2+B2)·B1ZB′2+B2(1−B1)+B1[s1+(s2+B2)B′1]R(π
2
)B1R(
π
4
)B
′
1 |+〉 (34)
5.1 Correctness of Malicious 8-states QFactory
We prove the existence of a mapping M (which we will call Merge Gadget), from 2 states |in1〉
and |in2〉, where |in1〉 ∈ {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} and |in2〉 ∈ {|+〉 , |−〉 , |+y〉 , |−y〉} to a state |out〉 =∣∣∣+L·pi
4
〉
, where L = L1L2L3 ∈ {0, 1}3.
Namely, as defined in Protocol 5.1, M is acting in the following way:
M(|in1〉 , |in2〉) =MX,2MX,1∧Z2,3∧Z1,2
[∣∣∣+pi
4
〉
⊗ |in1〉 ⊗ |in2〉
]
(35)
9Here it is worth pointing out that a similar result (in a more complicated method) was achieved in [DK16]. That
technique however, is applied in the information theoretic setting.
18
|+pi
4
〉 • ?> =<89 :;|±〉 s1
|in1〉 Z • ?> =<89 :;|±〉 s2
|in2〉 Z |out〉
Figure 2: Merge Gadget
Theorem 5.1. In an honest run, the Output state of the Malicious 8-states QFactory Protocol is
of the form
∣∣∣+L·pi
4
〉
, where L = L1L2L3 ∈ {0, 1}3.
Proof. In an honest run, using the Merge Gadget (Figure 2) we get:
M(|in1〉 , |in2〉) =MX,2MX,1∧Z2,3∧Z1,2
[∣∣∣+pi
4
〉
⊗ |in1〉 ⊗ |in2〉
]
(36)
Using the correctness of Malicious 4-states QFactory (Thereom 3.1), we have that:
|in1〉 = HB1XB2 |0〉 (37)
|in2〉 = R(π
2
)B
′
1ZB
′
2 |+〉 (38)
Thus:
|out〉 =MX,2MX,1∧Z2,3∧Z1,2
[∣∣∣+pi
4
〉
⊗HB1ZB2 |+〉 ⊗R(π
2
)B
′
1ZB
′
2 |+〉
]
(39)
Which is then equivalent to:
|out〉 = R[π(B′2 +B2 +B1 · (s1 + s2)) +
π
2
(B′1 + (B2 + s2) · B1) +
π
4
B1] |+〉 (40)
As a result, we obtain:
L1 = B
′
2 ⊕B2 ⊕ [B1 · (s1 ⊕ s2)]
L2 = B
′
1 ⊕ [(B2 ⊕ s2) ·B1] (41)
L3 = B1 (42)
It can also be noticed that, in an honest run of Malicious 8-states QFactory, the client can
efficiently determine L: using b1, b2, y1, y2 and the trapdoors t1k, t
2
k, he first obtains (B1, B2) and
(B′1, B
′
2), and after receiving s1, s2, he determines the description of the state prepared by the
server.
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5.2 Security against Malicious Adversaries of Malicious 8-states QFactory
In any run of the protocol, honest or malicious, the state that the client believes that the server
has, is given by Theorem 5.1.
Therefore, as in the case of Malicious 4-states QFactory, the task that a malicious server wants to
achieve, is to be able to guess, as good as he can, the index of the output state that the client
thinks the server has produced. In particular, in our case, the server needs to guess the bits L2 and
L3 (corresponding to the basis) of the (honest) output state.
Definition 5.1 (8 states basis blindness). Similarly, we say that a protocol (πA, πB) achieves
basis-blindness with respect to an ideal set of 8 states S if:
• S is the set of states that the protocol outputs, i.e.:
Pr[|φ〉 ∈ S | ( , |φ〉)← (πA‖πB)] = 1
• and if no information is leaked about the index bit B1B2 of the output state of the protocol,
i.e:
∀A,Pr[B1 = B˜1 and B2 = B˜2 | (B1B2B3, B˜1B˜2)← (πA‖A)] ≤ 1/4 + negl(n)
Theorem 5.2. Malicious 8-states QFactory satisfies 8-state basis blindness with respect to the ideal
set of states {|+〉 ,
∣∣∣+pi
4
〉
, ..,
∣∣∣+ 7pi
4
〉
}.
Proof. Firstly, we use Theorem 3.2 to obtain that B1 and B
′
1 are completely hidden from any ad-
versary.
We prove the following:
If there exists a QPT adversary A that is able to break the 8-states basis blindness property of
Malicious 8-states QFactory (determine the indices L2 and L3 with probability
1
4 +
1
poly1(n)
for
some polynomial function poly1), then we can construct a QPT adversary A′ that can break the
4-states basis blindness of the Malicious 4-states QFactory protocol (determine the basis bit with
probability 12 +
1
poly2(n)
, for some polynomial poly2(·)).
The input to A′ should be consisting only of the F family index, k, and the description of h.
Next we show how to construct A′ to determine the corresponding index B1 or B′1 of the output
state (of one of the 2 Malicious 4-states QFactory runs), by using as a subroutine A that acts as
follows: receives as input 2 function indices k(1) and k(2), runs Malicious 8-states QFactory and
then A is able to output the correct basis bits L2 and L3, with probability 14 + 1poly1(n) .
Before we describe A′, we need to define the following 3 values:
P2 = probability that A guesses correctly L2;
P3 = probability that A guesses correctly L3;
P⊕ = probability that A guesses correctly L2 ⊕ L3;
Now, given that A is able to produce both L2 and L3 with probability 14 + 1poly1(n) , this implies
that max(P2, P3, P⊕) ≥ 12 + 1poly2(n) for some polynomial poly2(·) (see proof in Appendix A).
We will construct A′ such that if P3 is the maximum, then A′ can determine B1 (break the basis
blidness of the first Malicious 4-states QFactory run) and if P2 or P⊕ is the maximum, then A′ can
determineB′1 (break the basis blidness of the the second ”rotated” Malicious 4-states QFactory run).
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A′(k, h, 1n)
1 : // k(1) corresponds to the input for the first run of Malicious 4-states QFactory - with the output index (B1, B2),
2 : // while k corresponds to the input for the second run - with the output index (B′1, B
′
2)
3 : (k(1), t
(1)
k )←$GenF (1n)
4 : // As the probability P of successfully guessing L2 and L3 is
1
4
+
1
poly1(n)
5 : // We know that max(P2, P3, P⊕) ≥ 1
2
+
1
poly2(n)
6 : if P3 = max(P2, P3, P⊕)
7 : // we break the basis-blindness of the first Malicious 4-states QFactory by determining B1
8 : (y(1), y(2), b(1), b(2), s1, s2), (L˜2, L˜3)← A(k, k(1), h)
9 : // (y(1), y(2), b(1), b(2), s1, s2) represents the classical communication received from A
10 : // during the run of Malicious 8-states QFactory, and (L˜2, L˜3) - are the guesses of A for the indices of the outcome
11 : B˜1 ← L˜3
12 : return B˜1// as B1 = 1⊕ L3 as seen in Eq. 42 and we have success probability ≥
1
2
+
1
poly2(n)
13 : else
14 : // we break the basis-blindness of the second Malicious 4-states QFactory by determining B′1
15 : (y(1), y(2), b(1), b(2), s1, s2), (L˜2, L˜3)← A(k(1), k, h)
16 : // (y(1), y(2), b(1), b(2), s1, s2) represents the classical communication received from A
17 : // during the run of Malicious 8-states QFactory, and (L˜2, L˜3) - are the guesses of A for the indices of the outcome
18 : (z(1), z′(1))← InvF (y(1), t(1)k )
19 : B1 ← h(z(1))⊕ h(z′(1))
20 : B2 ← [b(2)n +
∑
(z
(2)
i ⊕ z′(2)i ) · b(2)i ]B1 + h(z(2))(1 −B1) mod 2
21 : if P2 = max(P2, P3, P⊕)
22 : // Then B′1 = L2 ⊕ B1 · (B2 ⊕ s2) as seen in Eq. 41
23 : B˜′1 ← L˜2 ⊕ [B1 · (B2 ⊕ s2)]
24 : return B˜′1
25 : if P⊕ = max(P2, P3, P⊕)
26 : B˜′1 ← L˜2 ⊕ L˜3 ⊕B1 ⊕ [B1 · (B2 ⊕ s2)]
27 : return B˜′1
28 :
6 Malicious-abort 4-states QFactory: treating the abort case
In this section, we will discuss an extension of Malicious 4-states QFactory, whose aim is to achieve
basis blindness even against adversaries that could try to exploit the fact that Malicious 4-states
QFactory can abort when there is only one preimage associated to the y returned by the server.
One may think that we could just send back this accept/abort bit to the server, but unfortunately
it could leak additional information on the hardcore bit d0 (which corresponds to the basis B1 of
the produced qubit) to the server, and from an information theory point of view, as soon as the
probability of acceptance is small enough, we cannot guarantee that this bit remains secret. On the
other hand, for honest servers, the probability of aborting is usually non-negligible, so we cannot
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neglect this case.
We stress out that it is also possible to guarantee that for honest servers this probability goes
negligibly close to 1 by making an appropriate choice of parameters for the function, and in that
case the initial protocol of Malicious QFactory defined Section 3 that outputs a random state on
Alice’s side when y does not have two preimages is secure, but this comes (as far as we know), at
the cost of using a function with is “less” secure. More specifically, instead of having a reduction
to GapSVP with a polynomial γ, the reduction usually goes to GapSVP with a super-polynomial
γ. Such function parameters has been used implicitly in other works [Mah18a] ([Bra18] later
removed this assumption), and for now they are believed to be secure (the best known polynomial
algorithm cannot break GapSVP with a γ smaller than exponential), but these assumptions are
usually not widely accepted in the cryptography community, and that’s why we aim to remove this
non-standard assumption.
The solution we propose in this section makes the assumption that the classical Yao’s XOR
Lemma also applies for one-round protocols (with classical messages) against quantum adversary.
This lemma roughly states that if you cannot guess the output bit of one round with probability
better than η, then it’s hard to guess the output bit of t independents rounds with probability
much better than 1/2+ ηt. As far as we know, this lemma as been proven only in the classical case
(see [GNW11] for a review of this theorem as well as the main proof methods), and some works
[VW08] even extend this lemma to protocols, and also to the quantum setting [She10, KSd04].
Unfortunately these last works focus mostly on communication and query complexity, and are not
really usable in our case.
Note also that we are also working on some other proof methods to get rid of this last assumption
and to improve the efficiency of the protocol by avoiding repetition (see Appendix H for more
details).
In the following, we will call “accepted run” a run of Malicious 4-states QFactory such that the
received y from the server has 2 preimages (“probability of success” also refers to the probability
of this event when the server is honest), and otherwise we call it an “aborted run”.
6.1 The Malicious-Abort 4-state QFactory Protocol
In a nutshell, the solution we propose is to run several instances of Malicious 4-states QFactory,
by remarking that we do not need to discard the aborted runs. Indeed, it is easy to see that in
these cases, the produced qubits will always be in the same basis (denoted by 0). The idea is then
to implement on the server side a circuit that will output a qubit having as basis the XOR of all
the basis of the accepted runs (without even leaking which runs are accepted or not), and check
on client’s side that the number of accepted runs is high enough (this will happen with probability
exponentially close to 1 for honest servers). If it is the case, the client will just output the XOR
of the basis of the accepted run, and otherwise (i.e. if the server is malicious), he will just pick a
random bit value.
Unfortunately, in practice things are a bit more complicated in order to be able to write the
proof of security, and we need to divide all the t runs into nc “chunks” of size tc, and test them
individually. Here is a more precise (but still high level) description of the protocol and proof’s
ideas:
• firstly, we run t = nc× tc parallel instances of Malicious 4-states QFactory, without revealing
the abort bit for any of these instances;
• then the key point to note is that for honest servers, if yi has only one preimage then the
output qubit produced by the server at the end of the protocol will be either |0〉 or |1〉, but
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cannot be |+〉 or |−〉 (with one preimage we do not have a superposition). In other words, the
basis is always the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis (denoted as 0) so we do not really need to abort. Therefore,
at the end, (for honest runs) the basis of the output qubits will be equal for all i ∈ [[0, t]] to
βi = d0,i · ai, where ai = 1 iff yi has two preimages, and ai = 0 otherwise. Of course, this
distribution will be biased against 0, but it is not a problem. See Lemma 6.2 for proof.
• then, it also appears that from t qubits in the basis β1, . . . , βt, we have a way to produce a
single qubit belonging to the set {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} whose basis B1 is the XOR of the basis
of the t qubits, i.e. B1 = ⊕ti=1βi (see Lemma 6.3).
• Then, the client will test every chunk, by checking if the proportion of accepted runs in every
chunk is greater than a given value pc. If all chunks have enough accepted runs, then the client
just computes and outputs the good value for the basis (which is the XOR of the hardcore bit
of all the accepted runs) and value bits. However, if at least one chunk does not have enough
accepted runs (which shouldn’t happen if the server is honest), then the client just outputs
random values for the basis and value bit, not correlated with server’s qubit (it’s equivalent
to say that a malicious server can always through away the qubit and pick a new qubit not
correlated with client’s one).
• Correctness: if the probability to have two preimages for an honest server is at least a constant
pa greater than 1/2 (the parameters we proposed in [CCKW18] have this property), and if
t is chosen high enough, the fraction of accepted runs will be close to pa, and we can show
that the probability to have a fraction of accepted runs smaller than a given constant pb < pa
is exponentially (in t) close to 0 (cf Lemma 6.4). So with overwhelming probability, all the
chunks will have enough accepted runs, i.e. honest servers will have a qubit corresponding to
the output of the client.
• Soundness: to prove the security of this scheme, we first prove Lemma 6.6 that it is impossible
for any adversary to guess the output of one chunk with a probability bigger than a constant
η < 1 (otherwise we have a direct reduction that breaks the hardcore bit property of gK).
Now, using the quantum version of Yao’s XOR Lemma that we conjecture at Conjecture 6.1,
we can deduce that no malicious server is able to guess the XOR of the tc chunks/instances
with probability better than 1/2 + ηtc + negl(n), which goes negligibly close to 1/2 when
tc = Ω(n).
So putting everything together, the parties will just run t = nc · tc Malicious 4-states QFactory in
parallel, the client will then check if
∑
i ai is higher than pc · tc for all the nc chunks, and if so he
will set B1 = ⊕ti=1di · ai (server has a circuit to produce a qubit in this basis as well). Otherwise
B1 will be set to a uniformly chosen random bit (it is equivalent to say that a malicious server can
destroy the qubit, and this is also unavoidable even with a real quantum communication), and we
still have correctness with overwhelming probability for honest clients.
For the exact algorithm see Protocol 6.1, and go to Theorem 6.7 for the theorem/proof of
security (some of the proofs have been moved to appendix Appendix G).
6.2 Correctness and security of Malicious-Abort 4-state QFactory
Now, we will formalize and prove the previous statements.
Conjecture 6.1 (Yao’s XOR Lemma for one-round protocols (classical messages) against quantum
adversary).
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Let n be the security parameter, let fn : Xn×Yn → {0, 1} be a (possibly non-deterministic) family of
functions (usually not computable in polynomial time), and let χn be a distribution on Xn efficiently
samplable. If there exists δ(n) such that |δ(n)| ≥ 1
poly(n) and such that for all polynomial (in n)
quantum adversary An : Xn → Yn × {0, 1},
Pr
[
β˜ = fn(x, y) | (y, β˜)← An(x), x← χn
]
≤ 1− δ(n)
then, for all t ∈ N∗, there is no polynomial quantum adversaries A′n : X tn → Ytn × {0, 1} such that
Pr
[
β˜ =
t⊕
i=1
fn(xi, yi) | (y1, . . . , yt, β˜)← A′n(x1, . . . , xt), x1 ← χn, . . . , xt ← χn
]
≥ 1
2
+(1−δ(n))t+negl(n)
Lemma 6.2 (Aborted runs are useful). If πA4 and πB4 are following the Malicious 4-states QFac-
tory protocol honestly, and if y has not 2 preimages, then the output qubit produced by πB4 is in
the basis {|0〉 , |1〉}.
The proof can be found in the Appendix G.
|+π/2〉 • ?> =<89 :;|±〉 s1,1
|in1〉 Z • ?> =<89 :;|±〉 s1,2
|+π/2〉 • ?> =<89 :;|±〉 s2,1
|in2〉 Z • ?> =<89 :;|±〉 s2,2
...
...
...
|+π/2〉 • ?> =<89 :;|±〉 st,1
|int〉 Z • ?> =<89 :;|±〉 st,2
|+〉 Z Z Z |out〉
Figure 3: The XOR gadget circuit Gad⊕ (run on server side)
Lemma 6.3 (Gadget circuit Gad⊕ computes XOR). If we denote by bi the basis of |ini〉 (equal
to 0 if the basis is 0/1, and 1 if the basis is +/−), and if we run the circuit Gad⊕ (inspired by
measurement based quantum computing) represented Figure 3 on these inputs, then basis of |out〉
is equal to ⊕ti=1bi.
The proof can be found in the Appendix G.
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We will now describe here the protocol of Malicious-Abort 4-states QFactory:
Protocol 6.1 Malicious-Abort 4-states QFactory Protocol
Requirements:
Public: The family of functions F : D → R and h described above, such that the probability of
having two pre-images for a random image is greater than a constant pa > 1/2.
This protocol is based on some constants tc ∈ N (number of repetitions per chunk), nc ∈ N
(number of chunks), pa ∈ (1/2, 1] (lower bound on the probability to have an accepted run in
the honest protocol), pc ∈ (1/2, 1] < pa (fractions of the runs per chunk that must be accepted).
These constants can be chosen to have overwhelming probability of success for honest players, and
negligible advantage for a malicious adversaries trying to guess the basis.
Stage 1: Run multiple QFactories
– Client: prepares t = nc × tc public keys/trapdoors:
(
(k(i,j), tk(i,j))← GenF (1n)
)
i∈[[1,nc]],j∈[[1,tc]].
The Client then sends the public keys k(i,j) to the Server, together with h.
– Server and Client: follow Protocol 3.1 t times, with the keys sent at the step before. Client
receives ((y(i,j), b(i,j)))i,j , and sets for all i, j: a
(i,j) = 1 iff |f−1(y(i,j))| = 2, otherwise a(i,j) = 0, and
B
(i,j)
1 and B
(i,j)
2 like in Protocol 3.1 when a
(i,j) = 1 (otherwise B
(i,j)
1 = 0 and B
(i,j)
2 = h(f
−1(y)).
Server will get t outputs |in(i,j)〉.
Stage 2: Combine runs and output
– Server: applies circuit Figure 3 on the t outputs |int〉, and outputs |out〉.
– Client: checks that for all chunks i ∈ [[1, nc]] the number of accepted runs is high enough, i.e.∑
j a
(i,j) ≥ pctc.
• If at least one chunk does not respect this condition, then picks two random bits B1 (the
basis bit) and B2 (the value bit) and outputs (B1, B2), corresponding to the description of
the BB84 state HB1XB2 |0〉.
• If all chunks respect this condition, then sets B1 :=
⊕
i,j B
(i,j)
1 (the final basis is the XOR of
all the basis), and B2 will be chosen to match the output of Figure 3.
Lemma 6.4 (Probability of correctness of Malicious-Abort 4-states QFactory for one chunk). If
the probability to have an accepted run in Malicious 4-states QFactory with honest parties is greater
than a constant pa > 1/2, i.e.
Pr[|f−1k (y)| = 2 | (πA4‖πB4)] ≥ pa
(where πA4 and πB4 are the honest protocols of Malicious 4-states QFactory) then the probability
to have at least pbtc accepted runs (with pb < pa, pb considered as a constant) is exponentially (in
tc) close to 1:
Pr
[∑
i
ai ≥ pbtc | (πtcA4⊕c‖πtcB4⊕c)
]
≥ 1− 1
e2(pa−pb)2tc
= 1− negl(tc )
(where πtcA4⊕c and π
tc
B4⊕c are the (honest) parties of the Protocol 6.1 restricted on one chunk of size
tc, or, equivalently tc parallels repetition of the protocol Protocol 3.1)
The proof can be found in the Appendix G.
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Lemma 6.5 (Correctness of Protocol 6.1). The protocol Protocol 6.1 is correct with overwhelming
probability as soon as t = poly(n) and tc = Ω(n), i.e.
Pr
[|out〉 = HB1ZB2 | ((B1, B2), |out〉)← (πA‖πB)] ≥ 1− negl(n)
The proof can be found in the Appendix G.
Definition 6.1. For all public key k and image y, we define a(k, y) = 1 iff |f−1k (y)| = 2, and
a(k, y) = 0 otherwise.
Then, for all tc ∈ N and pc ∈ [0, 1], we define βtc,pc(k(1), . . . , k(tc), y(1), . . . , y(tc)) as the (randomized)
function that outputs a random bit if
∑
i a(k
(i), y(i)) < pc · tc, and outputs otherwise ⊕i(a(k(i), y(i)) ·
d
(i)
0 ), where d
(i)
0 is the hardcore bit corresponding to k
(i) := (K(i), gK(i)(z
(i)
0 )), i.e. d
(i)
0 = h(z
(i)
0 ).
Lemma 6.6 (Solving one chunk is pretty difficult). Let pc ∈ (12 , 1]. Then, there exists no polynomial
adversary A such that
Pr
[
B˜1 = βtc,pc(k
(1), . . . , k(tc), y(1), . . . , y(tc)) | (y(1), . . . , y(tc), B˜1)← A(k(1), . . . , k(tc))
]
> η
with η = 12
(
1 + 12pc
)
, and the randomness being on the randomness of β, A, and on the choice of
(k(i))i and (y
(i))i.
The proof can be found in the Appendix G.
Theorem 6.7 (Malicious-Abort QFactory is correct and secure). Assuming Conjecture 6.1, and
by making sure that the probability for the family F to have two preimages for a random image
is bigger than a constant pa > 1/2, then there exists a set of parameters pc, tc and nc such that
Protocol 6.1 is correct with probability exponentially close to 1 and basis-blind, i.e. such that for all
polynomial adversaries A:
Pr
[
B˜1 = B1 | ((B1, B2), B˜1)← (πA4⊕‖A)
]
≤ 1
2
+ negl(n)
More precisely, we need tc ∈ (1/2, pc) to be a constant, and both tc and nc need to be polynomial in
n and Ω(n).
The proof can be found in the Appendix G.
7 Verifiable QFactory
In the preceding protocols, Malicious 4-states QFactory and Malicious 8-states QFactory, the pro-
duced qubits came with the guarantee of basis-blindness (Definition 3.1 and Definition 5.1). While
this property refers to the ability of a malicious adversary to guess the honest basis bit(s), it tells
nothing about the actual state that a deviating server might produce. For a number of applications,
and most notably for verifiable blind quantum computation [FK17b], the basis-blindness property is
not sufficient. What is required is a stronger property, verification, that ensures that the produced
state was essentially prepared correctly, even in a malicious run.
26
7.1 Verifiable QFactory Functionality
There are two issues with trying to define a verification property for QFactory. The first is that
the adversarial server can always abort, therefore the verification property can only ensure that
the probability of non-abort and cheat is negligible. The second issue is that, since the final state
is in the hands of the server, the server can always apply a final deviation on the state10. This is
not different with what happens in protocols that do have quantum communication. In that case,
the adversarial receiver (server) can also apply a deviation on the state received before using that
state in any subsequent protocol. This deviation could even be that the server replaces the received
state with a totally different state.
Here, we define the strongest notion of verifiable QFactory possible, which exactly captures the
idea of being able to recover the ideal state from the real state without any knowledge of the (secret)
index of the ideal state. In Appendix B we show that this notion is sufficient for any protocol that
includes communication of random secret qubits of the form
∣∣+Lπ/4〉 which includes a verifiable
quantum computation protocol. Furthermore, in Appendix C we show that it is possible to relax
slightly the definition of verifiable QFactory.
Definition 7.1 (Verifiable QFactory). Consider a party that is given a state uniformly chosen from
a set of eight states S = {ρL |L ∈ {0, 1, ..., 7}} or an abort bit, where S is basis-blind i.e. given a
state sampled uniformly at random from S, it is impossible to guess the last two bits of the index L
of the state within the set S with non-negligible advantage. We say that this party has a Verifiable
QFactory if, it aborts with small probability and when he does not abort, there exists an isometry
Φ, that is independent of the index L, such that:
Φ(ρL)
ǫ≈ |+Lπ/4〉 〈+Lπ/4| ⊗ σjunk (43)
where the state σjunk is independent of the index L.
It is worth stressing here, that if the security setting is computational (as in this work), the
basis-blindness and the approximate equality above involve a QPT distinguisher, while the isometry
Φ needs to be computable in polynomial time.
7.2 Blind Self-Testing
Before giving a verifiable QFactory protocol, we define a new concept of blind self-testing, that
will be essential in proving the security of the former. Self-testing is a technique developed [MY03,
MMMO06, vDMMS07, MHYS12, Mck14] that ensures that given some measurement statistics,
classical parties can be certain that some untrusted quantum state (and operations), that two or
more quantum parties share, is essentially (up to some isometry) the state that the parties believe
they have. In high-level, we are going to use a test of this kind in order to certify that the output
of Verifiable QFactory is indeed the desired one.
Existing results, that we will call non-local self-testing, only deal with how to exploit the non-
locality (the fact that the quantum state tested is shared between non-communicating parties) to
test the state and operations. Naturally, the correctness is up to a local isometry (something that
the servers can apply, while preserving the non-communication condition).
Here, instead of testing a single non-local state, we test a family of states, where the non-locality
property is replaced by the blindness property (the fact that the server is not aware - he is blind
10However that deviation needs to be independent of anything that is secret.
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- of which state from the (possibly known) family of states he is actually given in each run of the
protocol). To see how this is closely related, one can imagine the usual non-local self-testing of
the singlet state, where one quantum side (Alice) actually performs a measurement (as instructed).
From the point of view of the other quantum side (Bob), he has a single state that (in the honest
run) is one of the BB84 states, while he is totally oblivious about the basis of the state he has (if
that was not the case it would lead to signalling the basis choice of Alice’s measurement). However,
this is, by no means the most general case. Here we introduce the concept of blind self-testing
formalising the above intuition.
We give here the most general case of blind self-testing and we conjecture that it holds. In
Appendix D we list three simpler scenarios (of increasing complication) that lead to the most
general case given here, following similar steps with the extension of simple i.i.d. self-testing to fully
robust and rigid self-testing in existing literature [MMMO06, MHYS12, HYN12, RUV13, CGJV17].
In Appendix E we provide a proof for the security of the first (simpler) case, while the full analysis
of the most general blind self-testing goes beyond the scope of this work (as indicated by the large
volume of high profile papers in the non-local self-testing cases) and will be the topic of a future
publication.
Protocol 7.1 Blind self-testing: The general case
– The server prepares a single state ρtot (consisting of N qubits in the honest run). This state has a
corresponding index consisting of N 3-bit indices Li (Li ∈ {0, ..., 7} ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}), and the server
is basis blind with respect to each of these N indices, i.e. (being computationally bounded) he
cannot determine with non-negligible advantage the two basis bits of any index Li. On the other
hand, the client does know all the indices Li’s.
– The client, randomly chooses a fraction f of the qubits to be used as tests and announces the set
of corresponding indices T = {i1, · · · , ifN} ⊂ {1, 2, ..., N} to the server.
– For each test qubit ij ∈ T , the client chooses a random measurement index Mij ∈ {000, · · · , 111}
and instructs the server to measure the corresponding qubit in the
{
|+Mijπ/4〉 , |−Mijπ/4〉
}
basis.
– The server returns the test measurement results {c(ij )}.
— For each fixed pair (L,M), the client gathers all the test positions that correspond to that pair
and from the relative frequencies, the client obtains an estimate for the probability pL,M (where by
convention we have that pL,M corresponds to the +1 outcome, while 1− pL,M to the −1).
– If |pL,M − cos2((L−M)π/8)| ≥ ǫ2 for any pair (L,M) the client aborts.
Output: If the client does not abort (and this happens with non-negligible probability), then
there exists an index-independent polynomial isometry Φ = Φk1 ⊗ · · ·Φkl, given by products of the
isometries in Fig. 4, that is applied to a random subset of non-tested qubits i, such that:
Φ(Trall but k1,··· ,kl qubitsρtot)
ǫ(ǫ1,ǫ2)≈
(
|+Lk1π/4〉k1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |+Lklπ/4〉kl
)
⊗ σjunk (44)
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|+〉 H • H •
|Ψ(L)〉 X ′ −iY ′
Figure 4: The isometry of the blind self-testing. Note that the controlled gates are controlled in
the X-basis, i.e. ∧U12(a |+〉+ b |−〉)1 ⊗ (|ψ〉)2 = a |+〉1 ⊗ |ψ〉2 + b |−〉1 ⊗ U |ψ〉2.
In this most general setting, we make no assumption on the state ρtot produced by the server
and moreover, we want to recover the full tensor product structure of the resulting states as given by
Eq. (44). In the non-local self-testing literature, Azuma-Hoeffding, quantum de-Finetti theorems
and rigidity results [Hoe63, AZU67, CFS02, BH13] were used to uplift the simple i.i.d. case and
prove the security in the most general setting.
7.3 The Verifiable QFactory Protocol
In this section we introduce a protocol for the final version of our functionality, Verifiable QFactory.
Here, we give the protocol, show the correctness and the security, namely that the protocol achieves
the verification property from Definition 7.1, based on the conjectured security of the most general
blind self-testing given in Protocol 7.1.
The basic idea is the following: repeat the Malicious 8-states QFactory multiple times, then the
client chooses a (random) fraction of the output qubits and uses them for a test and next instructs
the server to measure the test qubits in random angles and, finally, the client checks their statistics.
Since the server does not know the states (or to be more precise, the basis bits), he is unlikely to
succeed in guessing the correct statistics unless he is honest (up to some trivial relabelling). Note
that the output qubits and the measurement angles, need to be from all the set of the 8-states,
which is one of the reasons we wanted to give the 8-states extension of our basic Malicious 4-states
QFactory protocol11.
11This is actually related with Bell’s theorem as one can see later from the similarity with self-testing results.
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Protocol 7.2 Verifiable QFactory
Requirements: Same as in Protocol Protocol 3.1
Input: Client runs N times the algorithm (k(i), t
(i)
k ) ← GenF (1n), where i ∈ {1, · · · , N} denotes
the ith run. He keeps the t
(i)
k ’s private.
Protocol:
– Client: runs N times the Malicious 8-states QFactory Protocol 5.1.
– Client: records measurement outcomes y(i), b(i) and computes and stores the corresponding index
of the output state L(i).
– Client: instructs the server to measure a random fraction rf of the output states, each in a ran-
domly chosen basis of the form {|+M (i)π/4〉 , |−M (i)π/4〉}. HereM (i) is the index of the measurement
instructed.
– Server: returns the measurement outcomes c(i).
– Client: for each pair (L,M) collects the results c(j) for all j’s that have the specific pair and with
the relative frequency obtains an estimate for the probability p(L,M).
– Client: aborts unless all the estimates of the probabilities p(L,M) are ǫ-close to the ideal one i.e.
p(L,M)
ǫ≈ | 〈+Mπ/4|+Lπ/4〉|2.
Output: The probability of non-aborting and being far from the ideal state12 is negligible ǫ′
p(non-abort ∧∆(ρ
L(i1)···L(iN(1−f)) , ρideal) ≥ t(n)) ≤ ǫ
′ (45)
where i1, ..., iN(1−f) refer to the unmeasured qubits and where
Φ(ρideal) = ⊗N(1−f)k=1 |+L(ik)π/4〉 〈+L(ik)π/4| ⊗ σjunk (46)
and σjunk is a constant density matrix, while ǫ, ǫ
′ are all negligible functions and t(·) is a non-
negligible function.
Moreover, in an honest run, the probability of abort is negligible and the output is:
ρhonest = ⊗N(1−f)k=1 |+L(ik)π/4〉 〈+L(ik)π/4| (47)
Theorem 7.1 (correctness). If Protocol 7.2 is run honestly, it aborts with negligible probability and
the output (non-measured) qubits are exactly in a product state of the form |+L(ik)π/4〉 〈+L(ik)π/4|.
Therefore, the trivial isometry (the identity) suffices to recover the state of Eq. (43), and where
there is no junk state.
Proof. In an honest run, each of the outputs of different Malicious 8-states QFactory runs, are
of the correct form, therefore measuring any of those outputs in the {|±Mπ/4〉} basis returns the
correct statistics with high probability. Hence, the protocol does not abort, while the remaining
states are also prepared correctly.
Theorem 7.2 (security). Protocol 7.2 is a Verifiable QFactory (Definition 7.1), i.e. the probability
of accepting the tests and having a state far from the ideal is negligible irrespective of the deviation
of the adversary, assuming that the self-testing Protocol 7.1 is correct.
12The distance ∆ used here depends on the setting. In our case it is understood as a QPT distinguisher.
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Sketch of Proof. The outputs of the 8-states QFactory are basis blind, and satisfying the measure-
ment statistics too, leading exactly to the requirements of the definition of general blind self-testing
in Protocol 7.1. It follows that there exists an isometry such as that requested by Eq. (46).
See also in Appendix D and Appendix E, where we explain how this task is very similar with
self-testing results, and provide the first step for our self-testing result.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Probability of guessing two predicates
Lemma A.1 (Implication of guessing two predicates).
Let (a, b) ∈ {0, 1}2 be two bits sampled uniformly at random. Let f be any function of (a, b)
(eventually randomized). Then if A is an adversary such that Pr[A(f(a, b)) = (a, b)] ≥ 1/4+ 1
poly(n)
(where the probability is taken over the choice of a and b, the randomness of f and A), then either:
• A is good to guess a, i.e. P1 = Pr[a˜ = a | (a˜, b˜)← A(f(a, b))] ≥ 1/2 + 1/poly(n)
• A is good to guess b, i.e. P2 = Pr[b˜ = b | (a˜, b˜)← A(f(a, b))] ≥ 1/2 + 1/poly(n)
• A is good to guess the XOR of a and b, i.e. P⊕ = Pr[a˜ ⊕ b˜ = a ⊕ b | (a˜, b˜) ← A(f(a, b))] ≥
1/2 + 1/poly(n)
Proof. Let’s denote by:
• e1 = Pr
[
a˜ 6= a and b˜ 6= b | (a˜, b˜)← A(f(a, b))
]
• e2 = Pr
[
a˜ = a and b˜ 6= b | (a˜, b˜)← A(f(a, b))
]
• e3 = Pr
[
a˜ 6= a and b˜ = b | (a˜, b˜)← A(f(a, b))
]
• e4 = Pr
[
a˜ = a and b˜ = b | (a˜, b˜)← A(f(a, b))
]
Now, let us assume that the probability to do a correct guess is good, i.e. e4 ≥ 14 + 1poly(n) .
Because the probability of guessing correctly a (resp b) is bad, we have e2+ e4 ≤ 12 + negl(n) (resp.
e3 + e4 ≤ 12 + negl(n)), so e2 ≤ 14 + negl(n) (resp. e3 ≤ 14 + negl(n)). So e2 + e3 ≤ 12 − 1poly(n) , and
because e1 + e2 + e3 + e4 = 1, we get e1 + e4 ≥ 12 + 1poly(n) . But e1 + e4 is exactly the probability
to guess the XOR, i.e.
Pr
[
a˜⊕ b˜ = a⊕ b | (a˜, b˜)← A(f(a, b))
]
≥ 1
2
+
1
poly(n)
Appendix B: Replacing a quantum channel with verifiable QFac-
tory and Verifiable Quantum Computation
Here we prove that the verifiable QFactory can be used to replace any protocol that has a quantum
channel where the honest parties send random secret qubits of the form
∣∣+Lπ/4〉. We show this,
with a simple reduction: if there exist a QPT adversary A that can break the protocol with the
verifiable QFactory states ρL with non-negligible probability
1
p(n) , then there exist a QPT adversary
A′ that can break the security of the initial protocol that has quantum communication of the form∣∣+Lπ/4〉, with the same probability of success.
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A′(∣∣+Lπ/4〉)
1 : Prepare σjunk// junk does not depend on θ
2 : γ ←
∣∣+Lpi/4〉 〈+Lpi/4∣∣⊗ σjunk
3 : γ′ ← Φ−1 (∣∣+Lpi/4〉 〈+Lpi/4∣∣⊗ σjunk) = ρL// Φ is a QPT isometry
4 : return A(ρL)// succeeds with prob 1
p(n)
One of the most important possible applications of Verifiable QFactory is the classical client
verifiable blind quantum computation. In particular, the verifiable blind quantum computation
protocol of [FKD18] requires quantum communication in the beginning of the protocol and consists
of strings of states of the form |+Lπ/4〉 sent from the client to the server. According to our proof
above, this means that the protocol of [FKD18] is as secure as a classical client protocol that
replaces the quantum channel with verifiable QFactory.
Appendix C: Strong Blindness
We prove here that for our purposes, it is possible to slightly relax Definition 7.1. In particular,
given that the set of states S = {ρL |L ∈ {0, 1, ..., 7}} is basis-blind, and that there exists an index-
independent isometry Φ that maps a state ρL to a state ǫ-close to |+Lπ/4〉 〈+Lπ/4| ⊗ σ(L), then we
can prove that the junk state σ(L) has to be independent of L and thus satisfies Definition 7.1.
This property is (trivially) related with what we call “strong blindness”, since it essentially
means that basis blindness (along with the existence of some isometry) guarantees that the only
information that the server can learn from L is exactly the information he can learn in an honest
run.
Definition C.1 (8-states Strong Blindness). Consider a party that is given a state uniformly
chosen from a set of eight states S = {ρL |L ∈ {0, 1, ..., 7}}. We say that S is strongly blind if
the information the party can learn about the index L is bounded by the information that one can
obtain from the state
∣∣+Lπ/4〉.
Lemma C.1 (8-states strong blindness from isometry and weak blindness). Consider a party that
is given a state uniformly chosen from a set of eight states {ρL}, where the set is basis blind.
Assume also that there exists an isometry Φ, that is independent of the index L, such that
Φ(ρL)
ǫ≈ |+Lπ/4〉 〈+Lπ/4| ⊗ σ(L) (C.1)
where the state σ(L) is a general junk state. Then we can show that σ(L) should have negligible
dependence on L, and therefore, by applying the inverse of the isometry, it satisfies 8-states strong
blindness.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume that the state σ(L) does not have negligible depen-
dence on L. This means that one can guess L with non-negligible advantage from a random guess,
i.e. there exists some measurement such that when applied to σ(L) the measurement outcome is L
with probability PrL(σ(L)) =
1
8 +
1
poly(n) , for some polynomial poly.
From the 8 state basis blindness condition, we have that:
σ(L) + σ(L⊕ 100) ǫ≈ σ(L′) + σ(L′ ⊕ 100) ∀ L,L′ ∈ {0, 1, ..., 7}, (C.2)
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where ⊕ refers to bitwise xor.
Then, from this condition, we also deduce that: PrL⊕100(σ(L)) = 18 − 1poly(n) .
Now, consider the 2 bases: {L,L⊕100} and {L⊕010, L⊕110}. We will show next how to construct
a distinguisher between these 2 basis. The idea is to use the information about the index L obtained
from σ(L) and then perform an optimal quantum measurement on the |+Lπ/4〉 state given the prior
knowledge that we obtained from σ(L). This will lead to guessing information about the basis bit
with non-negligible probability.
Without loss of generality, we suppose PrL⊕010 ≥ PrL⊕110.
Then we get:
Pr (Lor L⊕ 010) = PrL + PrL⊕010 = PrL⊕100 + 2
poly(n)
+ PrL⊕010 ≥
PrL⊕100 + PrL⊕110 +
2
poly(n)
= Pr (L⊕ 100 or L⊕ 110) (C.3)
Then, to distinguish between the 2 bases, we will make a measurement on the |+Lπ/4〉 state (first
register), in the basis {L⊕ 011, L ⊕ 111}. The resulting distinguishing probability is:
Prsuccess =
2 +
√
2
4
·
(
1
2
+
1
poly(n)
)
+
(
1− 2 +
√
2
4
)
·
(
1
2
− 1
poly(n)
)
=
1
2
+
1
poly′(n)
(C.4)
which, given the basis blindness assumption, reaches a contradiction.
Appendix D: Blind self-testing intermediate scenarios
Here we introduce a number of scenarios that takes us from a very simple setting for blind self-
testing to the general case of Protocol 7.1.
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Protocol D.1 Blind Self-Testing: The independent identically distributed case (Scenario 1)
– The server chooses eight states {|Ψ(000)〉 , |Ψ(001)〉 , · · · , |Ψ(111)〉}, such that they are basis
blind13, i.e.
∆(ρL + ρL⊕100, ρL′ + ρL′⊕100) ≤ ǫ1 ∀ L,L′ ∈ {0, 1, ..., 7} (D.1)
where ρL := |Ψ(L)〉 〈Ψ(L)| ∀L ∈ {0, 1, ..., 7}.
– The client chooses randomly N indices, {L1, · · · , LN}, where each Li ← {000, · · · , 111} and sends
the set of states {|Ψ(L1)〉 , |Ψ(L2)〉 , · · · , |Ψ(LN )〉} to the server, while keeping the indices Li secret.
– The client, randomly chooses a fraction f of the qubits to be used as tests and announces the set
of corresponding indices T = {i1, · · · , ifN} ⊂ {1, 2, ..., N} to the server.
– For each test qubit ij ∈ T , the client chooses a random measurement index Mij ∈ {000, · · · , 111}
and instructs the server to measure the corresponding qubit in the
{
|+Mijπ/4〉 , |−Mijπ/4〉
}
basis.
– The server returns the test measurement results {c(ij )}.
– For each fixed pair (L,M), the client gathers all the test positions that correspond to that pair
and from the relative frequencies, the client obtains an estimate for the probability pL,M (where by
convention we have that pL,M corresponds to the +1 outcome, while 1− pL,M to the −1).
– If, for any pair (L,M) :
|pL,M − cos2((L−M)π/8)| ≥ ǫ2 (D.2)
the client aborts.
Output: If the client does not abort (and this happens with non-negligible probability), then there
exist an index-independent isometry Φ, given below in Fig. 4, such that
Φ(|Ψ(L)〉) ǫ(ǫ1,ǫ2)≈ |+Lπ/4〉 ⊗ |Ψ(000)〉 (D.3)
In Scenario 1, we make a number of assumptions. Firstly, the server actually knows the classical
description of all eight possible states. This is done to simplify things (see scenario 2b), but has one
disadvantage. The server can compute ρL + ρL⊕100 and unless ∆(ρL + ρL⊕100, ρL′ + ρL′⊕100) ≤ ǫ1
where ∆ is the trace distance, the server could guess the basis (with non-negligible advantage) by
performing a minimum error measurement between these two mixed states. The measurement itself
is likely to be of polynomial complexity, therefore it seems impossible to guarantee computational
basis blindness in this setting (unless, of course, the states are also information theoretically close).
For this reason, and to simplify the first exposition to blind self-testing, we give the proof by
assuming that Eq. D.1 is close in trace-distance in Appendix E. Now we proceed with the other
scenarios of blind self-testing, so that the relevance of this notion for verifiable QFactory becomes
apparent.
13The distance represents either trace-distance in the information theoretic security setting or QPT distinguisher
in the computational security setting.
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Protocol D.2 Blind self-testing: The independent non-identically distributed case (Scenario 2a)
– The server chooses N eight-plets of states {|Ψ(000)〉i , |Ψ(001)〉i , · · · , |Ψ(111)〉i}i∈{1,··· ,N}, such
that they are basis blind, i.e.
∆(ρi,L + ρi,L⊕100, ρi,L′ + ρi,L′⊕100) ≤ ǫ1 ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., N} ∀ L,L′ ∈ {0, ..., 7} (D.4)
where ρi,L := |Ψ(L)〉i 〈Ψ(L)|i.
– The client chooses randomly N indices, {L1, · · · , LN}, where each Li ← {000, · · · , 111} and sends
the set of states {|Ψ(L1)〉1 , |Ψ(L2)〉2 , · · · , |Ψ(LN )〉N} to the server, while keeping the indices Li
secret.
– The client, randomly chooses a fraction f of the qubits to be used as tests and announces the set
of corresponding indices T = {i1, · · · , ifN} ⊂ {1, 2, ..., N} to the server.
– For each test qubit ij ∈ T , the client chooses a random measurement index Mij ∈ {000, · · · , 111}
and instructs the server to measure the corresponding qubit in the
{
|+Mijπ/4〉 , |−Mijπ/4〉
}
basis.
– The server returns the test measurement results {c(ij )}.
– For each fixed pair (L,M), the client gathers all the test positions that correspond to that pair
and from the relative frequencies, the client obtains an estimate for the probability pL,M (where by
convention we have that pL,M corresponds to the +1 outcome, while 1 − pL,M to the −1). Note,
that each pL,M involves (in general) the statistics from different states.
– If |pL,M − cos2((L−M)π/8)| ≥ ǫ2 for any pair (L,M) the client aborts.
Output: If the client does not abort (and this happens with non-negligible probability), then
there exists an index-independent isometry Φ, given below in Fig. 4, that if applied to a random
non-tested qubit i, is acting in the following way:
Φ(|Ψ(L)〉i)
ǫ(ǫ1,ǫ2)≈ |+Lπ/4〉 ⊗ |Ψ(000)〉i (D.5)
We note that Scenario 2a is similar with scenario 1 with the crucial difference that different sets
of eight states are used for each of the N qubits. It is not hard to see that very similar analysis
with the one of Scenario 1 will apply, if instead of N different sets, one has N copies of the same
state, but replaces that state with the average state defined to be ρL(average) :=
∑N
i=1 ρi,L. The
result will then hold with high probability using Hoeffding inequalities [Hoe63].
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Protocol D.3 Blind self-testing: The independent non-identically distributed case (Scenario 2b)
– The server prepares N states |Ψ(L)〉i , i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, L ∈ {0, ..., 7}. For each of these states, the
server is basis blind, i.e. (being computationally bounded) he cannot determine the two basis bits
of the index L. On the other hand, the client does know the index L for each of the N states.14
– The client, randomly chooses a fraction f of the qubits to be used as tests and announces the set
of corresponding indices T = {i1, · · · , ifN} ⊂ {1, 2, ..., N} to the server.
– For each test qubit ij ∈ T , the client chooses a random measurement index Mij ∈ {000, · · · , 111}
and instructs the server to measure the corresponding qubit in the
{
|+Mijπ/4〉 , |−Mijπ/4〉
}
basis.
– The server returns the test measurement results {c(ij )}.
— For each fixed pair (L,M), the client gathers all the test positions that correspond to that pair
and from the relative frequencies, the client obtains an estimate for the probability pL,M (where by
convention we have that pL,M corresponds to the +1 outcome, while 1 − pL,M to the −1). Note,
that each pL,M involves (in general) the statistics from different states.
– If |pL,M − cos2((L−M)π/8)| ≥ ǫ2 for any pair (L,M) the client aborts.
Output: If the client does not abort (and this happens with non-negligible probability), then
there exist an index-independent polynomial isometry Φ, given below in Fig. 4, that if applied to
a random non-tested qubit i is acting in the following way:
Φ(|Ψ(L)〉i)
ǫ(ǫ1,ǫ2)≈ |+Lπ/4〉 ⊗ |Ψ(000)〉i (D.6)
The crucial difference in scenario 2b, is that the server prepares only one state (not eight). In
the previous scenarios, it was the client choosing which index L is used, and thus, unless the states
|Ψ(L)〉 leaked information about the (basis bits of the) index, the server was blind. Here we impose
this by requiring explicitly that the server prepares a state that he is basis-blind with respect to
its index. There are two consequences of these differences.
First, now that the state is prepared on the server side, the client does not need to have any
quantum ability, and his part in the protocol is purely classical. Second, since the state is prepared
in the server’s side, it is clear that we can no longer be in the information-theoretic setting, since,
with unbounded computation power, he would be able to recover the exact label L. On the positive
side, the issue we had in scenario 1, that the server could perform minimum error measurements
is no longer valid, since the server does not know the classical description of the two states (ρi,L +
ρi,L⊕100; ρi,L′ + ρi,L′⊕100) that he needs to distinguish and thus cannot find the corresponding
minimum error measurement. Finally, some care is needed to specify how the client can possibly
know the index L while the server (that prepares the state) he does not. One way to achieve this
is given in Malicious 8-states QFactory. Actually, scenario 2b corresponds exactly to the setting
of Verifiable QFactory, provided that whatever deviation the server does in one round of Malicious
8-states QFactory is restricted (and independent) to other rounds.
Finally, we can generalise further (Protocol 7.1 removing the assumption of tensor produce
states.
14This can be achieved either by having the client have exponential capacity, or by having the server prepare the
states using some choice made by the client that has kept some side trapdoor information too.
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Appendix E: Proof of Scenario 1: i.i.d. blind self-testing
Given the protocol D.1 (Scenario 1), we can assume that there exist eight untrusted, binary observ-
ables O′M , with ±1 eigenvalues, where we define O′0 := X ′, O′010 := Y ′. Each of these observable
are of polynomial size, i.e. can be performed by a QPT party. The corresponding ideal observables
are denoted without prime and we have OM = |+Mπ/4〉 〈+Mπ/4| − |−Mπ/4〉 〈−Mπ/4|. We denote ρL
the set of the eight (untrusted) states, and as defined in scenario 1 we consider the pure states (a
purification in general) |Ψ(L)〉.
We can see that index independent isometry in Figure 4 gives us:
Φ(|+〉 |Ψ(L)〉) := |+〉 (I +X
′)
2
|Ψ(L)〉+ |−〉 (−iY ′)(I −X
′)
2
|Ψ(L)〉 (E.1)
and we want to show that the state in Eq. (E.1) is
ǫ≈ |+Lπ/4〉 ⊗ |Ψ(000)〉 using the constrains
coming from the basis blindness property and the measurement statistics of the test qubits. In this
first exposition to the blind self-testing, we are going to prove the correctness up to ǫ, while the
details of the robustness of this result (the explicit dependence of the final ǫ on ǫ1, ǫ2 appearing in
the constraints) is left for future work.
Theorem E.1. If Protocol D.1 does not abort (with non-negligible probability) then the isometry
given by Fig. 4 satisfies the condition of Eq. (D.3).
To prove this theorem we first need two lemmas.
Lemma E.2. For any set of (eight) states {|Ψ(L)〉} as from scenario 1, that is basis blind, i.e.
|(ρL + ρL⊕100) − (ρL′ + ρL′⊕100)| ≤ ǫ1, all eight states belong (approximately) in a 2-dimensional
subspace spanned by the vectors {|Ψ(000)〉 , |Ψ(100)〉}.
Proof. The binary observables O′M have ±1 eigenvalues, and can therefore be written as O′M =
(+1)P+M + (−1)P−M where P±M are the projections on the +1 and −1 eigenspace, respectively. It
follows trivially that (O′M )
2 = I and that the corresponding projections are P+M =
I+O′M
2 and
P−M =
I−O′
M
2 .
Moreover, if the protocol does not abort (and this happens with non-negligible probability), we
also have the constraints on the expectation values of the observables coming from Eq. (D.2).
From 〈Ψ(L)|O′L |Ψ(L)〉
ǫ2≈ 1 and 〈Ψ(L)|O′L⊕100 |Ψ(L)〉
ǫ2≈ −1, we get that O′L |Ψ(L⊕ 100)〉 ≈
− |Ψ(L⊕ 100)〉 and thus
P+L |Ψ(L)〉 ≈ |Ψ(L)〉 , P−L |Ψ(L)〉 ≈ 0
P−L |Ψ(L⊕ 100)〉 ≈ |Ψ(L⊕ 100)〉 , P+L |Ψ(L⊕ 100)〉 ≈ 0
which means that 〈Ψ(L⊕ 100)|Ψ(L)〉 ≈ 0. The space spanned by two vectors {|Ψ(L)〉 , |Ψ(L⊕ 100)〉}
is two dimensional and for all L the state 1/2(ρL + ρL⊕100) is the identity in that subspace. Now
from the basis blindness condition we have that 1/2(ρL + ρL⊕100)
ǫ1≈ 1/2(ρ000 + ρ100), which means
that all states |Ψ(L)〉 belong to that (fixed) 2-dimensional subspace. We will denote the projection
on this 2-dimensional subspace as PΨ.
Lemma E.3. The states given in Protocol D.1 are approximately of the form
|Ψ(L)〉 ǫ≈ cos(Lπ
8
) |Ψ(000)〉+ eiφ sin(Lπ
8
) |Ψ(100)〉 (E.2)
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with φ being a constant (independent of L). Furthermore, the untrusted operator Y ′ acts in the
following way:
Y ′ |Ψ(100)〉 = e−iφ |Ψ(000)〉 (E.3)
Proof. From Lemma E.2 we know we can express all states in the following form:
|Ψ(L)〉 ≈ eif2(L)(a0(L) |Ψ(000)〉+ eif1(L)a1(L) |Ψ(100)〉) (E.4)
where a0(L), a1(L), f1(L) are functions to be determined and f2(L) is an overall complex phase
that we could ignore, but we keep it here to remind that we can use this to simplify the final
expressions. From the statistics of the measurements of the X ′ observable, we get (directly) that
a0(L) ≈ | cos Lπ8 | , a1(L) ≈ | sin Lπ8 |.
|Ψ(L)〉 ≈ | cos Lπ
8
| |Ψ(000)〉+ eif1(L)| sin Lπ
8
| |Ψ(100)〉 (E.5)
where we dropped the global phase eif2(L). Now for L 6= 000, 100, from 〈Ψ(L)|Ψ(L⊕ 100)〉 ≈ 0 we
obtain that:
f1(L⊕ 100) = (f1(L) + π) mod 2π (E.6)
and we can express the states grouped in four orthogonal bases:
|Ψ(000)〉 ; (E.7)
|Ψ(001)〉 = | cos π
8
| |Ψ(000)〉+ eif1(001)| sin π
8
| |Ψ(100)〉 ;
|Ψ(010)〉 = 1√
2
(
|Ψ(000)〉+ eif1(010) |Ψ(100)〉
)
;
|Ψ(011)〉 = | sin π
8
| |Ψ(000)〉+ eif1(011)| cos π
8
| |Ψ(100)〉 ;
|Ψ(100)〉 ;
|Ψ(101)〉 = | sin π
8
| |Ψ(000)〉 − eif1(001)| cos π
8
| |Ψ(100)〉 ;
|Ψ(110)〉 = 1√
2
(
|Ψ(000)〉 − eif1(010) |Ψ(100)〉
)
;
|Ψ(111)〉 = | cos π
8
| |Ψ(000)〉 − eif1(011)| sin π
8
| |Ψ(100)〉
(E.8)
where we used some identities such as | cos(3π/8)| = | sin(π/8)|, etc. Now, we have three parameters
to fix, namely f1(001), f1(010), f1(011). For notational simplicity, we will use c := | cos π/8| ; s :=
| sinπ/8|.
Then, we will use the statistics that we have from Eq. (D.2), when measuring in a different
than the X ′ basis. Expressing |Ψ(001)〉 in the Y ′ basis we get:
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|Ψ(001)〉 = 1√
2
(
c+ sei(f1(001)−f1(010))
)
|Ψ(010)〉+ 1√
2
(
c− sei(f1(001)−f1(010))
)
|Ψ(110)〉 (E.9)
From Eq. (D.2) and the probability of obtaining the result 010 when having the state |Ψ(001)〉 we
obtain:
1√
2
|
(
c+ sei(f(001)−f(010))
)
| ≈ c (E.10)
that is possible only if ei(f(001)−f(010)) = 1, i.e. we have:
f1(001) = f1(010) mod 2π (E.11)
Similarly, by expressing |Ψ(011)〉 in the Y ′ basis we get:
|Ψ(011)〉 = 1√
2
(
s+ cei(f1(011)−f1(010))
)
|Ψ(010)〉+ 1√
2
(
s− cei(f1(011)−f1(010))
)
|Ψ(110)〉 (E.12)
From Eq. (D.2) and the probability of obtaining the result 010 when having the state |Ψ(011)〉, we
have:
1√
2
|
(
s+ cei(f(011)−f(010))
)
| ≈ c (E.13)
that is possible only if ei(f(011)−f(010)) = 1, i.e. we get:
f1(011) = f1(010) mod 2π (E.14)
Setting f(001) := φ, we use Eqs. (E.6, E.11, E.14) and Eq. (E.7) becomes:
|Ψ(000)〉 ; (E.15)
|Ψ(001)〉 = cos π
8
|Ψ(000)〉+ eiφ sin π
8
|Ψ(100)〉 ;
|Ψ(010)〉 = cos 2π
8
|Ψ(000)〉+ eiφ sin 2π
8
|Ψ(100)〉 ;
|Ψ(011)〉 = cos 3π
8
|Ψ(000)〉+ eiφ sin 3π
8
| |Ψ(100)〉 ;
|Ψ(100)〉 ;
|Ψ(101)〉 = − cos 5π
8
|Ψ(000)〉 − eiφ sin 5π
8
|Ψ(100)〉 ;
|Ψ(110)〉 = − cos 6π
8
|Ψ(000)〉 − eiφ sin 6π
8
|Ψ(100)〉 ;
|Ψ(111)〉 = − cos 7π
8
|Ψ(000)〉 − eiφ sin 7π
8
|Ψ(100)〉 ;
(E.16)
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where we used cos 5π8 = − sin π8 ; sin 5π8 = cos π8 ; − cos 6π8 = 1√2 ; sin
6π
8 =
1√
2
; cos 3π8 = sin
π
8 ;
sin 3π8 = cos
π
8 ; − cos 7π8 = cos π8 and sin 7π8 = sin π8 . By noting that each state is invariant if
multiplied by a global phase (an overall minus sign in our case) we get the expression:
|Ψ(L)〉 = cos(Lπ
8
) |Ψ(000)〉+ eiφ sin(Lπ
8
) |Ψ(100)〉 (E.17)
as required for Lemma E.3. The action of the observable Y ′ projected on the subspace that all
|Ψ(L)〉 belong to, is:
PΨY
′PΨ = |Ψ(010)〉 〈Ψ(010)| − |Ψ(110)〉 〈Ψ(110)| (E.18)
and given that
|Ψ(010)〉 = 1√
2
(
|Ψ(000)〉+ eiφ |Ψ(100)〉
)
|Ψ(110)〉 = 1√
2
(
− |Ψ(000)〉+ eiφ |Ψ(100)〉
)
(E.19)
we get:
PΨY
′PΨ = e−iφ |Ψ(000)〉 〈Ψ(100)|+ eiφ |Ψ(100)〉 〈Ψ(000)|
Y ′ |Ψ(100)〉 = e−iφ |Ψ(000)〉 (E.20)
p
Proof of Theorem E.1. We can now prove Theorem E.1. If the protocol does not abort, it means
that the condition on the test measurement statistics is satisfied, and the above Lemmas hold.
We substitute Eq. (E.2) in the isometry, note that (I+X
′)
2 |Ψ(000)〉 = 1 = (I−X
′)
2 |Ψ(100)〉 and
(I+X′)
2 |Ψ(100)〉 = 0 = (I−X
′)
2 |Ψ(000)〉 and use Eq. (E.3) to get the desired result:
Φ(|+〉 |Ψ(L)〉) = |+〉 (I +X
′)
2
|Ψ(L)〉+ |−〉 (−iY ′)(I −X
′)
2
|Ψ(L)〉
= |+〉 cos(Lπ
8
) |Ψ(000)〉+ |−〉 (−iY ′)eiφ sin(Lπ
8
) |Ψ(100)〉
= |+〉 cos(Lπ
8
) |Ψ(000)〉+ |−〉 eiφ sin(Lπ
8
)(−ie−iφ) |Ψ(000)〉
=
(
cos(
Lπ
8
) |+〉 − i sin(Lπ
8
) |−〉
)
|Ψ(000)〉
= |+Lπ/4〉 |Ψ(000)〉 (E.21)
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Appendix F: Generalisation to pseudo-homomorphic functions
F.1 Notation and remarks about the generalisation
Note that later on, we will do a slight abuse of notation, and if K is a set of keys, we will denote
by k ← K the sampling of a key in K. Note that this sampling may not be uniform, and depends
on a fixed distribution.
Moreover, in order to have a function usable in practice, we would like to be able to create
the uniform superposition on all the elements of the input set. However, in practice, it may not
be possible to have an exact superposition on all the elements of this input set. Therefore we will
consider in the following that the function g has an input set Z that is a bit bigger, but so that
we can create an exact uniform superposition on all the elements of this set, and in order to deal
with the fact that Z is not the initial input set, we will say that g(z) = ⊥ as soon as z does not
belong to the initial input set of g. Note that we may also abuse notation for simplicity, and also
write g(z) = ⊥ when z does not even belong to Z and when g is not defined on a given input z.
We will also need to extend some notions to this new notion. For example, we will say that a
function g : Z → Y ∪ ⊥ is injective when for all y ∈ Y, |f−1(y)| ≤ 1.
F.2 Definition
Definition F.1 ((η, Z, Z0, D)-homomorphic family of functions). Let us consider a family of
functions {gk : Z → Y ∪ ⊥}k∈K, as well as two symmetric binary group relations ∗ and ⋆, with ∗
acting on a set containing Z and Z0, ⋆ acting on Y ∪ ⊥, and so that ∀y ∈ Y,⊥ ⋆ y = ⊥. We say
that {fk}k∈K is an (η, Z, Z0, D)-homomorphic function if D is a distribution on Z0 and
Pr
k←K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[z ∗ z0 ∈ Z and gk(z) ⋆ gk(z0) = gk(z ∗ z0) 6= ⊥] ≥ η
Note that we do require that z is sampled uniformly from Z, but z0 is sampled from a distribution
D on Z0 that may not be uniform.
Definition F.2 (δ-2-regular family of functions). Let us consider a family of functions {fk : X →
Y ∪⊥}k∈K. For a fixed k, Y(2) will be the set of y having two preimages: Y(2)fk = {y ∈ Y, |f
−1
k (y)| =
2}. Then, this family of functions is said to be δ-2-regular if
Pr
k ←$K
x←$X
[fk(x) ∈ Y(2)fk ] ≥ δ
Lemma F.1 ((η, Z, Z0)-homomorphy to δ-2-regularity). Given a family of functions {gk : Z →
Y ∪ ⊥}k∈K that is both injective and an (η, Z, Z0)-homomorphic family of functions, then it’s
possible to build a family {fk′ : Z × {0, 1} → Y ∪ ⊥}k′∈K′ that is δ-2-regular, with δ = η.
Proof. Let’s do the following construction. To sample a key k′ ∈ K′, we first sample a key k from
K, as well as an z0 ←D Z0, and we define k′ = (k, y0 := fk(z0)). Then, we define fk′(z, 0) = gk(z)
and fk′(z, 1) = gk(z) ⋆ y0, also denoted later as fk′(z, c) = gk(z) ⋆ (c · y0) for simplicity. Now, we
remark that:
Pr
k′ ←$K′
x←$X
[fk′(x) ∈ Y(2)f ′
k
] (F.1)
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= Pr
k ←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
c←$ {0,1}
[gk(z) ⋆ (c · gk(z0)) ∈ Y(2)f ′
k
] (F.2)
=
1
2
×
(
Pr
k←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[gk(z) ∈ Y(2)f ′
k
] + Pr
k ←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[gk(z) ⋆ gk(z0) ∈ Y(2)f ′
k
]
)
(F.3)
≥1
2
×
(
Pr
k←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[gk(z) ∈ Y(2)f ′
k
and z ∗ z−10 ∈ Z and gk(z) = gk(z ∗ z−10 ) ⋆ gk(z0) 6= ⊥
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C1
] (F.4)
+ Pr
k ←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[gk(z) ⋆ gk(z0) ∈ Y(2)f ′
k
and z ∗ z0 ∈ Z and gk(z) ⋆ gk(z0) = gk(z ∗ z0) 6= ⊥
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C2
]
)
(F.5)
=
1
2
×
(
Pr
k←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[gk(z) ∈ Y(2)f ′
k
|C1]× Pr
k←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[C1] (F.6)
+ Pr
k ←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[gk(z) ⋆ gk(z0) ∈ Y(2)f ′
k
|C2]× Pr
k ←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[C2]
)
(F.7)
Now, remark that when z0 ∗z ∈ D and gk(z0)⋆gk(z) = gk(z0 ∗z) 6= ⊥, then y := gk(z)⋆gk(z0) ∈
Y(2)f ′
k
. Indeed:
• y ∈ Y because gk(z) ⋆ gk(z0) 6= ⊥ and the ⋆ operator is defined on Y ∪⊥
• there are at least two preimages mapping to y, because y = fk(z, 1) = gk(z) ⋆ gk(z0) =
gk(z ∗ z0) = fk(z ∗ z0, 0).
• there are at most two preimages mapping to y: indeed gk is injective, so both partial functions
f(·, 0) and f(·, 1) are injective, so it’s not possible to have more than two preimages mapping
to y.
So Pr k ←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[gk(z) ⋆ gk(z0) ∈ Y(2)f ′
k
|C2] = 1. Similarly, Pr k ←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[gk(z) ∈ Y(2)f ′
k
|C1] = 1. So we can
rewrite the above equation as:
Pr
k′ ←$K′
x←$X
[fk′(x) ∈ Y(2)f ′
k
] (F.8)
≥1
2
×
(
Pr
k←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[C1] + Pr
k←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[C2]
)
(F.9)
Now, remember that {gk}k is (η, Z, Z0)-homomorphic, so Pr k←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[C2] ≥ η. By symmetry, we
also have Pr k ←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[C1] ≥ η. Indeed:
Pr
k ←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[z ∗ z−10
´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
zˆ
∈ Z and gk(z) = gk(z ∗ z−10 ) ⋆ gk(z0) 6= ⊥] (F.10)
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= Pr
k ←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[zˆ ∈ Z and z ∈ Z and zˆ = z ∗ z−10 and gk(z) = gk(zˆ) ⋆ gk(z0) 6= ⊥] (F.11)
= Pr
k ←$K
z0←DZ0
zˆ ←$Z
[zˆ ∈ Z and z ∈ Z and zˆ = z ∗ z−10 and gk(z) = gk(zˆ) ⋆ gk(z0) 6= ⊥] (F.12)
= Pr
k ←$K
z0←DZ0
zˆ ←$Z
[zˆ ∗ z0 ∈ Z and gk(zˆ ∗ z0) = gk(zˆ) ⋆ gk(z0) 6= ⊥] (F.13)
= Pr
k ←$K
z0←DZ0
z ←$Z
[C2] (F.14)
≥η (F.15)
So Prk′ ←$K′
x←$X
[fk′(x) ∈ Y(2)f ′
k
] ≥ η, which concludes the proof.
Appendix G: Proof of the Malicious-Abort QFactory
In this section we moved some of the proofs of the security and correctness of Protocol 6.1, which
are summarised in Theorem 6.7.
Proof of Lemma 6.2. The function fk cannot have more than two preimages by assumption, and
in the Malicious 4-states QFactory protocol the output y is in the image of fk. So it means that
y has exactly one preimage x. So after measuring the last register, the states will be in the state
|0〉⊗ |x〉⊗ |y〉. Then, we apply Uh, so the states becomes |d〉⊗ |x〉⊗ |y〉 with d ∈ {0, 1}. We remark
that the first qubit is not entangled with the measured qubits, so the output qubit will be |d〉,
which is indeed in the basis {|0〉 , |1〉}.
Proof of Lemma 6.3. The entire analysis of the circuit will be performed only with respect to the
basis of the states of the circuit. Let us first examine the first part of the circuit, where we apply
∧Z between |+pi
2
〉 and |in1〉 = HB1(1)ZB2(1) (with B1(1) the basis of |in1〉) and then measure the
first qubit in the |±〉 basis, and we denote the result state V1.
The result of this operation is:
- if B1
(1) = 0, V1 = R(π(B
(1)
2 + s1,1 + 1)) |+pi2 〉 ∈ {|+pi2 〉 , |−pi2 〉}
- if B1
(1) = 1, V1 = X
B
(1)
2 |0〉 ∈ {|0〉 , |1〉}
In other words, the state V1 belongs to the basis B0 = {|+pi
2
〉 , |−pi
2
〉}, if B1(1) = 0 and to the basis
B1 = {|0〉 , |1〉} if B1(1) = 1.
Now, we can think of the circuit as having t states Vi ∈ {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+pi
2
〉 , |−pi
2
〉}, where every Vi has
the basis B1
(i). Then, to compute the output state |out〉 of Gad⊕, for every i ∈ {1, ..., t} we have
to apply CZ between Vi and |+〉 and then measure the first qubit in the |±〉 basis.
So let us do this step first for V1. The result is a state W1 = X
s1,2HV1, thus we obtain that:
W1 belongs to the basis B0 = {|+pi
2
〉 , |−pi
2
〉}, if B1(1) = 0 and to the basis B2 = {|+〉 , |−〉} if
B1
(1) = 1.
Next we do the same operations between V2 and W1, the result being a state W2, then between V3
and W2 and so on, therefore, the outcome state is |out〉 =Wt.
We will prove by induction that the state Wt ∈ {|+〉 , |−〉 , |+pi
2
〉 , |−pi
2
〉}, where the basis of Wt is
given by B1 = B1
(1) ⊕ ...⊕B1(t).
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As we have proved already for the basis case t = 1, we now prove the induction step. Suppose that
Wn ∈ {|+〉 , |−〉 , |+pi
2
〉 , |−pi
2
〉} with basis B1 = B1(1) ⊕ ...⊕B1(n).
To obtainWn+1 we have to apply ∧Z between Vn+1 andWn and then measure the first qubit. Then
after computing this, we obtain that the basis of Wn+1 is B1 if the basis of Vn+1 is B1
(n+1) = 0
and the basis of Wn+1 is 1 ⊕ B1 if the basis of Vn+1 is B1(n+1) = 1. In other words, the basis of
Wn+1 is given by B1 = B1
(1) ⊕ ...⊕B1(n) ⊕B1(n+1), which concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6.4. In the honest case, all runs are independents, so let us define {Ai}ti=1 as the
(binary) random variables whose values are 1 iff the i-th run has two preimages associated with yi.
We know that for all i, E(Ai) ≥ pa > pb. So let us define ε = E(Ai)− pb > pa− pb. Using Chernoff
inequality we have
Pr
[
1
t
t∑
i=1
Ai < E(Ai)− ε
]
≤ e−2ε2t ≤ e−2(pa−pb)2t = negl(t)
(because pa − pb is constant)
Proof of Lemma 6.5. The Lemma 6.4 gives that the probability to have more than pctc accepted
runs for a given chunk is 1−negl(tc ), i.e. if tc = Ω(n), this probability is negl(n). So for nc chunks,
the probability to have one fail is (1 − negl(n))nc = 1− negl(n) as soon as nc = poly(n), which is
the case because t = tc× nc = poly(n). Then, when all the chunks are accepted, the correctness of
the output values is assured by Lemma 6.3.
Proof of Lemma 6.6. By contradiction, let us assume that there is an adversary A such that (we
omit the parameters for readability)
Pr
[
B˜1 = β
]
> η
Then, if we define ai := a(k
(i), y(i)),
η < Pr
[
B˜1 = β
]
= Pr
[∑
i
ai < pctc
]
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α
×1
2
+ Pr
[∑
i
ai ≥ pctc
]
× Pr
[
B˜1 = β |
∑
i
ai ≥ pctc
]
= α× 1
2
+ (1 − α)× Pr
[
B˜1 = β |
∑
i
ai ≥ pctc
]
≤ α× 1
2
+ (1 − α) = 1− α
2
so α ≤ 2(1 − η).
Now, we remark that we can bound also (1 − a) × Pr
[
B˜1 = β |
∑
i ai ≥ pctc
]
. Indeed, if this
value is too big then we can construct an adversary that could break the hardcore bit property of
gK . To do that, we define an adversary A′ taking as input a k, and whose goal is to define the
hardcore bit d0 associated with k. This adversary will pick tc− 1 public keys/trapdoors (k(i), tk(i)),
and hide k in the middle of these trapdoors. Then, A′ calls A with these tc keys, and outputs
d˜0 := B˜1 ⊕i a(i)d(i)0 , with B˜1 the output of A, and a(i) computed by using the y(i) provided by
A. We know that d˜0 = d0 when the guess of A′ was right, when
∑
i ai ≥ pctc, and when the y
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corresponding to the function k has two preimages. But this even occurs with probability greater
than (1−α)×Pr
[
B˜1 = β |
∑
i ai ≥ pctc
]
× pc, and because d0 is a hardcore bit, this probability is
bounded by 1/2 + negl(n), or equivalently:
(1− α)× Pr
[
B˜1 = β |
∑
i
ai ≥ pctc
]
≤ 1
2pc
+ negl(n)
Now, let’s come back to our probability to guess β:
Pr
[
B˜1 = β
]
= α× 1
2
+ (1− α)× Pr
[
B˜1 = β |
∑
i
ai ≥ pctc
]
≤ α× 1
2
+
1
2pc
+ negl(n)
≤ 1− η + 1
2pc
+ negl(n)
But on the other side, Pr
[
B˜1 = β
]
> η, so
η < 1− η + 1
2pc
+ negl(n)
η <
1
2
(
1 +
1
2pc
)
+ negl(n)
Because η and pc are constants
15 that do not depend on n, this equality is also true without the
negl(n):
η <
1
2
(
1 +
1
2pc
)
which is absurd because η = 12
(
1 + 12pc
)
.
Proof of Theorem 6.7. The proof of correctness is made Lemma 6.5, and the security is a direct
application of Conjecture 6.1: after using Lemma 6.6: this theorem provides a η such that it’s not
possible to solve one chunk with probability better than η < 1, so δ(n) := 1− η is a constant (and
δ(n) ≥ 1
poly(n)). Therefore Conjecture 6.1 tells us that no adversary can get the XOR of nc chunks
with probability better than 12 + η
nc + negl(n). But tc = Ω(n) and η is a constant, so no adversary
can get the XOR of nc chunks with probability better than
1
2 + negl(n), i.e. no adversary can find
B1 with probability better then
1
2 + negl(n).
Appendix H: Discussion about dealing with the abort case without
Yao’s XOR Lemma
The proof of security we have when we cannot assume that abort arrives with negligible probability
defined in Section 6 has two drawbacks: first it relies on the conjecture that Yao’s XOR Lemma is
15note that if we give them a dependence on n, we can make sure that η − 1
2
(
1 + 1
2pc
)
is non negligible, but for
simplicity we will keep them constant
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valid for one-round protocols (classical messages) with quantum adversary, but it also complicate
the protocols by adding replication. We are also working on a second method that runs this time
just one instance of Malicious 4-states QFactory, and will leaks the abort bit to the server. The
specificity of this method is that the hash function will be send after receiving the y, and will be
a 2-universal hash function (we just chose the function corresponding to the XOR of a random
subset of hardcore bits that is easy to implement on server side as well). We also require that
the δ-2-regular trapdoor family of functions needs to have a polynomial number of homomorphic
hardcore bits (we can easily extend our courstruction to have such requirements by just adding
q/2 ·(d0,1, . . . , d0,t, 0, . . . , 0)T ). This setting will bring us back very close to the requirements needed
by the leftover hash lemma [IALL89]. The advantage of this method is that we have a quantum
equivalent of this lemma [TSSR10], but unfortunately this lemma is valid (and expressed) in the
information theoretic framework. Because our familly will never be information theoretically secure,
but only computationally secure, we need an intermediate step to turn our information theoretically
secure argument into a computationally secure one. Usually, this is done by introducing lossy
functions [PW07], and then using some indistinguishable property between injective and lossy
functions to finish the proof. Unfortunately, our protocol has a non standard shape, and it’s not
yet clear how to define a in the lossy case to make sure an adversary cannot exploit a to distinguish
between lossy and non lossy.
We also point out that we can also create some constructions where the abort bit is independent
of the secret, by first sending a function whose goal is to create the superposition, and after receiving
the y, if y has two preimages, we send a single element with no noise As0 + q/2 · d0 that will be
used like if it were another raw in the y0. This problem is still supposed to be difficult, and because
the second message does not have noise, it cannot lead to an abort, to the abort is independent of
the secret. But the proof of security for this construction is also a work in progress.
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